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My dissertation consists of three essays about business cycles and monetary
policy.
The first essay (Chapter 1) studies the major determinant of business cy-
cles in a medium scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Some
recent studies argue that spillovers from land prices into the aggregate econ-
omy are the crucial drivers of business cycles. Other studies stress the im-
portance of investment shocks at business cycle frequencies. This essay eval-
uates these two strands of the literature in a single unified framework by
estimating a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with a collateral constraint on investment financing. The results are twofold:
(i) when these features are combined, neither shocks that drive most of land-
price fluctuations nor investment shocks are the primary source of U.S. busi-
ness cycles; and (ii) technology shocks play an important role in business
cycles.
The second essay (Chapter 2) develops a model which can explain the
flattening of the Phillips curve under low trend inflation. After the Great Re-
cession, associated with the decline in trend inflation, major economies face
a weak linkage between aggregate prices and economic activities. This phe-
nomenon is called as flattening of the Phillips curve. A challenge to standard
sticky price models is that they cannot explain this empirical fact. This es-
say incorporates the variable elasticity demand into a standard sticky price
model and tries to resolve the discrepancy between standard sticky price
models and the empirical fact. In the analysis, we first set out a two-period,
partial equilibrium model and study the firm’s pricing behavior under trend
inflation. Then, we develop a general equilibrium model. The analysis in this
essay clarifies that the key is the curvature of the demand curve.
vThe third essay (Chapter 3) empirically examines whether shock size mat-
ters for the US monetary policy. We use a nonlinear local projection method
and find that large monetary policy shocks are less powerful than the small
shocks. The empirical results are robust even after considering the period of
early Volker’s chairmanship and outliers. Furthermore, this study suggests
that the monetary policy design, rather than menu cost pricing and informa-
tion effects, is a relevant cause of the shock size dependency of policy effects.
Finally, this study re-examines some other asymmetries of monetary policy
effects through the lens of shock-size distribution.
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1Chapter 1
What is the Major Source of
Business Cycles: Spillovers from
Land Prices, Investment Shocks, or
Anything Else?
1
1.1 Introduction
The discussion of what drives business cycles dates back at least to the classic
studies of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Sims (1980). After the Great Re-
cession in the late 2000s, debate over the source of business cycles has gained
renewed attention, with a focus on the prominence of financial factors.
The literature, including Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), and
Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), emphasizes the role of housing in the economy.
By using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, these stud-
ies argue that spillovers from fluctuations in land (or housing) prices to other
major variables are important sources of business cycles. Among them, Liu,
1This chapter is the reprint of the article in Journal of Macroeconomics, vol. 57 (c).
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Wang, and Zha (2013) report that land-price dynamics driven by the hous-
ing demand account for approximately 28 percent of the variation in output
and 39 percent of the variation in investments in a neoclassical model with a
collateral constraint. Although their simple and tractable model provides a
good analytical starting point, it differs from typical business cycle models,
such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2007), which recent literature often uses to decompose for business cycles.
Other studies, represented by Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010)
and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011), use a standard business cy-
cle model with a rich shock propagation mechanism. These studies demon-
strate that shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) -disturbances
in transformation of investment goods into productive capital- are the pri-
mary source of fluctuations in output and investments in the U.S.2 More-
over, they argue that MEI shocks are proxies for financial factors because the
estimated MEI shocks correlate highly with credit spreads. These studies re-
inforce the momentum toward developing models that enrich financial fric-
tions.3 However, Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) and Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011) do not consider spillovers from land-price
fluctuations in the economy.
This study assesses these views within one unified framework and con-
siders the shock that is a more relevant major driver of business cycles. To
this end, we introduce land as a collateral asset in investment financing into
a standard medium-scale DSGE model similar to Justiniano, Primiceri, and
Tambalotti (2011). Because a medium-scale DSGE model suitably encom-
passes several views on the sources of business cycles, it provides a good
2Among the most influential studies in this area is Smets and Wouters (2007). They argue
that labor supply shocks primarily drive fluctuations in business cycles using an estimated
medium-scale DSGE model. Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) fault Smets and
Wouters (2007)’s conclusions for depending on their definition of investment. As explained
in data section, our investment data for estimation is the same definition of Justiniano, Prim-
iceri, and Tambalotti (2010).
3Wieland et al. (2016) summarize recent developments in this active area.
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experimental field for our objective.
In our estimated U.S. model, housing demand shocks determine most of
the land-price fluctuations. They account for 75 percent of land-price fluctua-
tions. However, they are not the primary source of business cycles. Housing
demand shocks account for 14.8 and 23.0 percent of the variation in output
and investment at business cycle frequencies. These numbers are approxi-
mately half of the numbers in the study of Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013). Fur-
thermore, MEI shocks account for only 2.6 and 6.7 percent of output and
investment fluctuations, respectively. In contrast, technology shocks sub-
stantially affect macroeconomic variables at business cycle frequencies. 43.8
percent of the variation in output is attributable to technology shocks.4 Nei-
ther housing demand shocks nor MEI shocks are primary drivers of business
cycles.
It is worth noting the reason why our results differ from those of Liu,
Wang, and Zha (2013) and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010). Dis-
crepancies in the studies of Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) and ours stem from
an assumption of the labor elasticity. The indivisible labor setting adopted
in Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) implicitly presumes an infinite Frisch elasticity
of labor supply (e.g. Hansen (1985)), whereas we allow this elasticity to be
finite and estimate it using data as in standard medium-scale DSGE models.
The amplification effects of a positive housing demand shock will be damp-
ened in our specification because a lower Frisch elasticity results in lesser
substitution effects and greater income effects.
Discrepancies in the studies of Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010)
and ours stem from the collateral constraint and data used in estimations. A
favorable MEI shock creates procyclical movements in consumption and in-
vestments but also creates countercyclical movements in stock prices because
4Kaihatsu and Kurozumi (2014) also point out that technology shocks are the major
source of business cycles using an estimated DSGE model.
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a MEI shock is a supply shock of capital accumulation. In a model with col-
lateral constraint, countercyclical movements in stock prices are transmitted
into movements in credits because stocks are pledged assets for collateral.
Hence, credits respond countercyclically to a MEI shock in the model. How-
ever, credits move procyclically in actual data. Therefore, MEI shocks fail to
be a major source of business cycles when a model is estimated using credit
data.
This study also relates to Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2013), who find
the collateral constraint mechanism to be not crucial in fitting their model to
the U.S. data. In our model, spillovers from housing demand through land
prices are modeled explicitly and estimated using land price data; however,
Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2013) consider only a collateral constraint on
the value of capital. Hence, our results complement those of Brzoza-Brzezina
and Kolasa (2013).
In the remainder of this paper, Section 1.2 provides an overview of our
model. Section 1.3 presents our estimation method and data. Section 1.4
describes the estimation results and discusses their implications. Section 1.5
concludes the study.
1.2 The model
A standard medium-scale DSGE model is estimated that shares major fea-
tures with Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters
(2007) and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011). It contains nominal
and real frictions that affect the decisions of economic agents. One key differ-
ence from models commonly used in the literature is the collateral constraint,
a lá Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), whereby a lender has to post collateral to ob-
tain external funds because of limited enforcement of financial contracts. We
extend the model to include a collateral constraint on investment financing
1.2. The model 5
so that it can describe spillovers from the housing market into investments
through land prices.5
The economy is populated by capital owners, households, final-goods
producers, intermediate-goods producers and the government. Agents’ prob-
lems and other constructions are as follows.
1.2.1 Capital owners
A representative capital owner receives utility from consuming Cc,t in each
period and invests in capital Kt and land Lc,t, which are rented to intermediate-
goods firms in competitive markets. Its objective is to maximize the follow-
ing lifetime utility,
Et
¥
å
s=0
bˆs log (Cc,t+s   gcCc,t+s 1) ,
where gc 2 [0, 1] is a parameter in the capital owner’s formation of consump-
tion habits. bˆ 2 (0, 1) is a capital owner’s subjective discount factor.
The capital owner confronts a flow of funds constraint and a capital accu-
mulation process with quadratic investment adjustment costs that penalize
deviations from steady-state investment growth, D I¯,
rkt Kt 1 + rltLc,t 1 + Et
Bt
Rt/pt+1
= Cc,t +
It
Ait
+ Bt 1 + ql,t (Lc,t   Lc,t 1) ,
Kt = (1  d)Kt 1 + zt
"
1  W
2

It
It 1
  D I¯
2#
It,
5Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) estimate
DSGE models with a collateral constraint using US data. In the former two studies, a part of
households face a collateral constraint on consumption. These models focus on the housing
investment and have difficulties in reproducing positive co-movements between land prices
and business investments. In the latter study, a capital owner faces a collateral constraint on
business fixed investment. Since we examine the propagation of housing demand shocks
through business investment, we adopt a modeling strategy similar to that of Liu, Wang,
and Zha (2013).
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where rkt and r
l
t are rental rates of capital and land, respectively, Bt is quan-
tity of bonds, Rt is the nominal gross return on bonds, ql,t is land prices in
terms of final goods, W > 0 is a parameter of investment adjustment cost,
d 2 (0, 1) is a depreciation rate, and zt represents an exogenous shock in
the efficiency with which a final good is transformed into physical capital.
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011) call it an MEI shock. Ait is an
exogenous shock in investment-specific technology. The stochastic processes
of all shocks are summarized in the latter part of this section.
Because of limited enforcement of financial contracts, the capital owner
can raise funds up to a fraction qt of the total value of collateral assets,
Bt  qtEt (ql,t+1Lc,t + qk,t+1Kt) , (1.1)
where qt is the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of pledged assets to collateral and
qk,t is the real shadow price of capital. We call qt a collateral constraint shock
and assume it is exogenous.
1.2.2 Households
Each household is continuously indexed as j within a unit interval. It receives
utility from consumption Ch,t(j) and landholdings Lh,t(j), and incurs disutil-
ity from labor supply Nt(j).6 Each household is a monopolistic supplier of
specialized labor. We presume that the household can access a portfolio of
state-contingent securities, which ensures that, in equilibrium, consumption
and asset holdings are identical for all households. The household’s objective
6As presented in a later section, the model is non-stationary because the growth rate of
technological progress follows stationary AR(1) process. To ensure existence of a balanced
growth path, we presume the utility function is log in consumption and separable with
labor. Conditions for the existence of balanced growth path is discussed in King, Plosser,
and Rebelo (1988).
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is to maximize the following lifetime utility,
Et
¥
å
s=0
bsnt+s

log (Ch,t+s   ghCh,t+s 1) + jt+s log (Lh,t+s)  Nt+s(j)
1+c
1+ c

,
given a flow of funds constraint,
Ch,t + ql,t (Lh,t   Lh,t 1) + Et B
d
t
Rt/pt+1
+ Tt Wt(j)Nt(j) + Bdt 1 +Pt + Qt(j),
where b 2 (0, 1) is a household’s subjective discount factor, gh 2 [0, 1] is a de-
gree of habit persistence, c  0 is an inverse of the Frisch’s labor supply elas-
ticity, Tt are lump-sum taxes, Wt(j) are real wages, Bdt are bond holdings, and
Pt are per-capita profits accruing to households from the ownership of firms.
Qt(j) are net cash flows from household j’s portfolio of state-contingent se-
curities. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), households are more patient
than capital owners. Therefore, 1 > b > bˆ. nt and jt are exogenous shocks in
intertemporal preference (patience) and household’s taste for landholdings,
respectively. Following Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), we label the land taste
shock jt the “housing demand” shock.
Regarding the specification of labor disutility, Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013)
adopt the indivisible labor setting of Hansen (1985) assuming that the Frisch’s
elasticity of labor supply is infinite, whereas standard medium scale DSGE
models including Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) and Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011) estimate the (inverse) Frisch’s elasticity. We
will estimate this parameter and analyze the effects caused by the difference
in specifications in the later section.
A large number of “employment agencies” transform a bundle of special-
ized labor Nt(j) into homogeneous labor inputs sold to intermediate-goods
producers in a competitive market. Their transformation function is a con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) form, Nt = [
R 1
0 Nt(j)
1/(ew,t+1)dj]ew,t+1.
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Elasticity of substitution, ew,t, follows the exogenous stochastic process.7
Profit maximization in a competitive market implies that the demand
function for a specialized labor input j is given by
Nt(j) =

Wt(j)
Wt
 (1+ew,t)/ew,t
Nt, (1.2)
where Wt are real wages paid by intermediate-goods producers for homoge-
neous labor input and an aggregate index of wages for specialized labor.
As in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), a certain fraction, xw 2 [0, 1),
of households cannot set their wages optimally at time t and follow the wage
indexation rule,Wt(j) = Wt 1(j) (pt 1)iw (p¯)1 iw Z¯ where iw 2 [0, 1] is the
degree of indexation to the past inflation, pt 1  Pt 1/Pt 2. p¯ and Z¯ are
steady-state inflation and economy-wide technological progress, respectively
and subsequently explained.
The remaining households have an opportunity to reset their wages opti-
mally to maximize (1.3) subject to the labor demand function (1.2),
Et
¥
å
s=0
xswb
s
n
 nt+s + lt+sWt(j)Psk=1 (pt+k 1)iw (p¯)1 iw Z¯
o
Nt+s(j), (1.3)
where lt is the Lagrange multiplier on the households’ flow of funds con-
straint.
1.2.3 Final-goods producers
Final-goods producers produce a final good Yt that combines a continuum
of intermediate goods fYt(i)gi2[0,1] and sell it in a competitive market. Their
production function is a CES form, Yt =
hR 1
0 Yt(i)
1/(ep,t+1)di
iep,t+1
. An elas-
ticity of substitution, ep,t, follows an exogenous stochastic process. Profit
7As suggested in Chang and Schorfheide (2003), this shock is observationally equivalent
to a labor supply shock. Hence, labor supply shocks in the household utility function are
omitted to avoid the collision in identification.
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maximization in a competitive market implies that the demand function for
an intermediate good i is
Yt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 (1+ep,t)/ep,t
Yt (1.4)
where Pt is an aggregate price index.
1.2.4 Intermediate-goods producers
Each intermediate-goods producer i is a monopolistically competitive firm
and indexed continuously within a unit interval. The producer is owned
by households and produces an intermediate good i, according to the Cobb-
Douglas production function of (1.5),
Yt(i) = max
n
Ant
h
Lt 1(i)fKt 1(i)1 f
ia
Ndt (i)
1 a   ZtF, 0
o
, (1.5)
where Lt(i), Kt(i) and Ndt (i) represent quantities of land, capital, and labor
employed by firm i, F denotes a fixed cost of production, Ant is an exoge-
nous neutral technological progress, and Zt is an economy-wide technologi-
cal progress that is a composite of neutral and investment-specific technolo-
gies.8
As in Calvo (1983), for every period, a certain fraction xp 2 [0, 1) of
intermediate-goods producers chosen randomly cannot set the price opti-
mally. Instead, they set their prices according to the price indexation rule,
Pt(i) = Pt 1(i) (pt 1)ip (p¯)1 ip where ip 2 [0, 1] is the degree of indexation
to past inflation.
8Given the production function in (1.5), Zt is defined as Zt 
(Ant )
1/[1 (1 f)a](Ait)(1 f)a/[1 (1 f)a].
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The remaining producers can reset prices to maximize the following dis-
counted future profits subject to the demand function of (1.4),
Et
¥
å
s=0
xsp
bsLt+s
Lt

Pt(i)
Pt+s
h
Psk=1 (pt+k 1)
ip (p¯)1 ip
i
 Vt+s

Yt+s(i),
where Lt is the marginal utility of households’ consumption and Vt is the
real marginal cost.9
1.2.5 Government
To focus on the role of collateral constraint in the economy and make our
results comparable to previous literature, we try to keep the other model’s
specifications such as the government’s policy rules as they are accepted in
standard DSGE models (i.e. Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano, Prim-
iceri, and Tambalotti (2010)).
Specifically, a monetary authority follows a generalized Taylor rule that
gradually adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to inflation and output
deviations from its hypothetical counterpart under the flexible price econ-
omy,
Rt
R¯
=

Rt 1
R¯
rr "pt
p¯
fp¯  Yt
Yt
fy#1 rr " Yt/Yt 1
Yt /Yt 1
#fdy
mpt,
where mpt is an exogenous monetary policy shock. Further, government
spending is a fraction of output, however its share is exogenously varying.
Gt =

1  1
gt

Yt,
where gt is an exogenous government spending shock.
9An intermediate-goods producer solves a cost-minimization problem, taking input
prices as given, regardless of whether the producer can adjust its price optimally.
The solution yields the marginal cost function, Vt = (af) af(a(1   f)) a(1 f)(1  
a)1 a[(Wt)1 a(rkt )a(1 f)(rlt)af]/Zt.
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1.2.6 Process of exogenous shocks
We assume three types of exogenous-shock processes in this economy. The
first type is specified in (1.6): a logarithm of shock x follows an autoregressive
of order one (AR(1)) process around its steady-state value x¯. MEI, collateral
constraint, housing demand, patience, monetary policy, and government ex-
penditure shocks belong to this family. The second type is specified in (1.7):
the growth rates of neutral and investment-specific technology shocks fol-
low an AR(1) process around deterministic growth rates. The third type is
specified in (1.8). As is commonly adopted in DSGE empirical studies, price
and wage markup shocks in the logarithm follow an autoregressive of or-
der one with a first-order moving average (ARMA(1,1)) process around their
steady-state values.10 The ARMA process is suitable to capture the volatile
fluctuations in price and wage inflations.
log (xt) = (1  rx) log (x¯) + rx log (xt 1) + hx,t, x 2 fz, q, j, n, mp, gg,
(1.6)
D log (Axt ) = (1  rx)D log (A¯x) + rxD log
 
Axt 1

+ hx,t, x 2 fn, ig, (1.7)
log (ex,t) = (1  rx) log (e¯x) + rx log (ex,t 1) + hx,t   qxhx,t 1, x 2 fp, wg.
(1.8)
10Following conventions in the literature (e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007)), we normalize
the price and wage markup shock to be a unit coefficient in the linearized price and wage
Eular equations, respectively.
12
Chapter 1. What is the Major Source of Business Cycles: Spillovers from
Land Prices, Investment Shocks, or Anything Else?
1.2.7 Market clearing
All markets clear in equilibrium. Market clearing conditions for goods, labor,
land, and bonds are denoted as follows:
Yt = Ct + It/Ait + Gt,
Nt = Ndt ,
L¯ = Lh,t + Lc,t,
Bt = Bdt
where L¯ is the total supply of land.
Because levels of neutral and investment-specific technologies introduce
non-stationarities into the model, we render variables stationary by detrend-
ing their respective stochastic trends. Equilibrium conditions are then log-
linearized. Finally, the linearized system of rational expectations is solved
into state-space representation and estimated.
1.3 Estimation method and data
We employ Bayesian methods to estimate posterior distributions of the model’s
structural parameters.11 The likelihood function and priors are incorporated
using the Bayes formula, and the resulting conditional distributions of pa-
rameters are posterior distributions.
We calibrate some parameters to values that are conventional in the liter-
ature. Specifically, households’ discount factor is 0.9925, which is equivalent
to a 1 percent discount rate per annum. Capital owners’ discount factor is
11An and Schorfheide (2007) provide a survey of Bayesian estimation of DSGE models.
For estimation, we use Dynare toolbox (Adjemian et al. (2011)).
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TABLE 1.1: Parameter calibration
Parameters Description Calibrated values
b Households’ discount factor 0.9925
bˆ Capital owners’ discount factor 0.97
1  a Labor share 0.65
q¯ LTV ratio 0.75
(ep   1)/ep Steady state price markup 0.85
(ew   1)/ew Steady state wage markup 0.85
q¯l L¯h/Y¯ Households’ landholdings over GDP at annual frequency 1.45
q¯l L¯e/Y¯ Capital owners’ landholdings over GDP at annual frequency 0.65
G¯/Y¯ Government expenditure to GDP 0.22
I¯/K¯ Investment over Capital 0.21
K¯/Y¯ Capital to GDP at annual frequency 1.15
0.97. This value is used in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).12 The share parame-
ter of labor in production is 0.65. We set the steady-state LTV ratio q¯ as 0.75
to be consistent with Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013). Given this calibration, the
credit to GDP ratio (B/Y) at the steady state can be approximated to the his-
torical average at annual frequency. The average markup ratios of price and
wage are 15 percent. Land-holdings to GDP of households and capital own-
ers are equivalent to those of Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013). The other values
are selected to be consistent with historical averages. Some parameters are
implicitly calculated from the steady state relationships. For example, the rel-
ative factor share of land to capital in the production function f is calculated
as f = q¯l L¯e/Y¯
bˆa(ep 1)/ep = 0.124.
Most prior distributions of parameters in Table 1.2 are in line with those
in previous studies. The prior of persistent parameters is a Beta distribution
with mean 0.6 and standard deviation 0.15. The only exception is monetary
policy shocks. We assign a less persistent prior mean, 0.2, to clearly identify
between the policy-rule’s inertia and the persistence of discretionary policy
shocks. Priors on the standard deviation of innovations are quite diffuse.
The model is estimated using 10 U.S. quarterly time series data items:
12We re-estimated the model with alternative calibration (bˆ = 0.985) and found that results
are almost similar to those with the baseline calibration.
14
Chapter 1. What is the Major Source of Business Cycles: Spillovers from
Land Prices, Investment Shocks, or Anything Else?
logarithmic first differences of private consumption, private business invest-
ments, land prices, credits, the inverse of the relative price of investment
goods, real wages, and GDP, the number of labor hours, the nominal inflation
of the consumption deflator, and the nominal effective federal funds rate. We
remove the sample means from all data to focus on the dynamics at business
cycle frequencies, as in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014).
The details of the datasets are as follows. Consumption is personal con-
sumption expenditures on non-durables and services. Investments represent
the sum of personal consumption expenditures on durables and gross private
domestic investments, including inventory investments. Labor input is the
log of total hours per person in the non-farm business sector. Credit is debt of
non-financial corporations. Land price is the FHFA based liquidity-adjusted
price index for residential land and is developed by Davis and Heathcote
(2007) and updated by Morris A. Davis. Following Justiniano, Primiceri, and
Tambalotti (2011), the consumption deflator is a chain-weighted price index
of personal consumption expenditures on non-durables and services. The
relative price of an investment is a chain-weighted price index of the pre-
viously described investments divided by the consumption deflator. Con-
sumption, investments, credits, GDP, real wages, and land prices are deflated
by the consumption deflator and, except for land prices, divided by the num-
ber of persons older than age 16 years in the population. The sample covers
1975/1Q to 2009/1Q. To make our results comparable to Justiniano, Prim-
iceri, and Tambalotti (2011) and avoid the effects of a zero bound on nominal
interest rates, the end of the sample is 2009/1Q.13
Our model and dataset encompass those of Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013)
and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011). Specifically, we add price
and wage inflations, policy rate, and GDP to the dataset of Liu, Wang, and
13Hirose and Inoue (2016) point out that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates
causes biased estimates of structural shocks even if estimated parameters are virtually unbi-
ased. The results are almost unchanged even if the end of the sample is 2008/4Q.
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Zha (2013), who estimate a flexible-price RBC model with collateral con-
straints. We add land prices and credits to the dataset of Justiniano, Prim-
iceri, and Tambalotti (2011), who estimate a standard medium-scale DSGE
model with price and wage stickiness but without collateral constraints.
For the posterior distribution, we create two chains of 200,000 draws us-
ing the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, and discarded the first 50 percent of
these draws. The acceptance ratios of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo simu-
lation are 37.82 and 37.63 percent in the respective chains. The multivariate
and univariate diagnostics of Brooks and Gelman (1998) suggest that the es-
timation has converged.
1.4 Estimation results
Table 1.2 presents the posteriors of the parameters. Tight credible intervals
suggest that the parameters are firmly estimated.14
Posterior parameters are within variations in previous DSGE estimations.
The inverse Frisch elasticity (4.056), which is assumed to be zero in Liu,
Wang, and Zha (2013), is statistically significant and similar to that of Jus-
tiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011) (4.444). One of the controversial pa-
rameters is the investment adjustment cost. Ours (0.552) is in the midrange
of these studies: 0.175 for Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), 2.657 for Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011), and 5.74 for Smets and Wouters (2007). Re-
garding the other major parameters, consumption habit persistence is 0.775
for households and 0.477 for capital owners. Both are similar to values in
previous studies such as Smets and Wouters (2007) (0.71) and Liu, Wang, and
Zha (2013) (0.500-0.658). They are slightly lower than the value in Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011) (0.859). Price and wage reset probabilities
14We check the estimated Lagrange multiplier on collateral constraint. It is fluctuating but
is significantly away from zero. As suggested in Jermann and Quadrini (2012), this result
implies the collateral constraint was binding during the period.
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TABLE 1.2: Prior and posterior distributions of parameters
Prior Posterior
Distribution Mean S.D. Mean 95% interval
Panel I: structural parameters
gl Habit formation (HH) B 0.60 0.15 0.775 0.721 0.828
gb Habit formation (C) B 0.60 0.15 0.477 0.302 0.650
xp Calvo (price) B 0.60 0.15 0.810 0.741 0.882
xw Calvo (wage) B 0.60 0.15 0.805 0.674 0.936
ip Price indexation B 0.60 0.15 0.195 0.080 0.307
iw Wage indexation B 0.60 0.15 0.256 0.149 0.365
W Investment adjustment cost G 5.00 3.00 0.552 0.316 0.775
c Inverse Frisch elasticity G 2.00 0.75 4.056 2.670 5.383
F/Y¯ Fixed cost per output B 0.15 0.05 0.088 0.045 0.127
fp Policy rule (inflation) G 1.50 0.15 1.411 1.203 1.624
fy Policy rule (output) G 0.20 0.10 0.073 0.043 0.102
fdy Policy rule (output growth) G 0.20 0.10 0.466 0.363 0.568
rr Policy rule (policy inertia) B 0.60 0.15 0.768 0.707 0.827
Panel II: autocorrelations and moving-averages of shocks
rn Preference B 0.60 0.15 0.621 0.502 0.746
rn Neutral technology B 0.60 0.15 0.288 0.201 0.375
ri Investment-specific technology B 0.60 0.15 0.249 0.159 0.332
rf Housing demand B 0.60 0.15 0.995 0.991 0.998
rq LTV B 0.60 0.15 0.969 0.958 0.981
rz MEI B 0.60 0.15 0.721 0.658 0.780
rp Price markup B 0.60 0.15 0.917 0.873 0.966
qp Price markup (MA) B 0.50 0.15 0.727 0.598 0.865
rw Wage markup B 0.60 0.15 0.804 0.610 0.976
qw Wage markup (MA) B 0.50 0.15 0.760 0.551 0.960
rmp Monetary policy B 0.20 0.05 0.210 0.132 0.287
rg Government B 0.60 0.15 0.909 0.878 0.940
Panel III: standard deviations of shocks
sn Preference G 1 0.50 1.00 2.141 1.696 2.595
sn Neutral technology G 1 0.10 1.00 0.657 0.589 0.724
si Investment-specific technology G 1 0.10 1.00 0.547 0.494 0.601
sf Housing demand G 1 0.50 1.00 6.737 4.650 8.655
sq LTV G 1 0.50 1.00 1.474 1.320 1.626
sz MEI G 1 0.50 1.00 2.201 1.774 2.606
sp Price markup G 1 0.50 1.00 0.259 0.215 0.302
sw Wage markup G 1 0.10 1.00 0.352 0.297 0.405
smp Monetary policy G 1 0.10 1.00 0.338 0.281 0.394
sg Government G 1 0.50 1.00 1.601 1.440 1.766
Log marginal likelihood -1847.235
Note: Habit formation(HH) and Habit formation(C) represent the degree of consumption
habit formation of households and capital owners, respectively. MA represents a moving-
average parameter. B, G, and G 1 correspond to the beta, gamma, and inversed gamma
distributions.
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and the degrees of indexation resemble those in Justiniano, Primiceri, and
Tambalotti (2011), although these nominal parameters are not estimated in
Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013).
To ensure the identification between housing demand and investment
shocks, we check the correlations between the draws from marginal poste-
rior distributions of related parameters. One is the standard deviations of
the housing demand and investment shocks and the other is the autoregres-
sive parameters of these shocks. Further, we execute the same exercise with
respect to the LTV and investment shocks. Table 1.3 suggests that invest-
ment shocks and housing demand (and LTV) shocks are clearly identified,
showing that all the correlation coefficients are small and less than or equal
to 10%.
TABLE 1.3: Identification between the investment and
collateral-related shocks
Investment versus housing demand shocks Investment versus LTV shocks
S.D. AR(1) S.D. AR(1)
0.043 -0.016 0.103 -0.034
Note: Table shows the correlation coefficients between the draws from marginal posterior
distributions.
Next, we evaluate the cyclical properties of the model and data. Business
cycles are fluctuations of aggregate economic activities occurring at approx-
imately the same time in many variables. Figure 1.1 displays cross correla-
tions between output and other variables to examine whether the model is
successful in capturing business cycle co-movements. The shaded areas are
the 95 percent confidence intervals of empirical cross correlations and the
solid lines are theoretical cross correlations of the baseline model. The figure
shows that our model can generate procyclical co-movements among impor-
tant variables. In particular, the figure well captures the cross correlation of
investments, which is our primary focus. The figure also indicates that there
still remains a further room for improvements in terms of the empirical fit.
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An introduction of adjustment costs in land transactions and financial con-
tracts may help to improve the cross correlations of land prices and credits.
FIGURE 1.1: Cyclicalities of selected variables: data and model
Note: Figure 1.1 displays cross correlations of selected variables with contemporaneous
GDP. The solid and dotted lines represent the cross correlations calculated from the baseline
model and 95 percent credible intervals, respectively. The shaded areas are the 95 percent in-
tervals of the correlation coefficients of the data. All data are transformed into year-on-year
growth rates.
1.4.1 Which shock is important at business cycle frequen-
cies?
This subsection addresses our main question: what is the major source of
business cycle fluctuations? Table 1.4 presents the contribution of each shock
to the variance of the variables at business cycle frequencies. Following Stock
and Watson (1999), we define business cycles as cycles between 6 and 32
quarters.15
First of all, Table 1.4 reports that housing demand shocks account for 74.9
percent of land-price fluctuations. Housing demand shocks determine most
of land-price fluctuations. Second, Table 1.4 suggests that neither housing
demand shocks nor investment shocks are the major determinant of business
cycle fluctuations,16 indicating that the primary driver of business cycles is
the technology shocks that account for 44.9 percent of output fluctuations.
15We split the whole sample period into the first and second half, and re-estimate the
model in these subsamples. Specifically, the first and second half of sample periods covers
1975/1Q to 1992/4Q and 1993/1Q to 2009/1Q, respectively. Our results are robust to these
subsample estimations. See the Appendix A for the detail.
16To check whether our results have an issue of weak identification, we compare prior and
posterior densities of the share of variance in variables due to housing demand shocks and
confirm that posterior density differs from prior density, indicating the likelihood informa-
tion is used for the posterior variance decomposition.
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Housing demand shocks account for 14.8 percent of output fluctuations and
23.0 percent of investment fluctuations. These results are different from those
reported in Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), in which 28.32 and 38.31 percent of
output and investment variations, respectively, are attributed to housing de-
mand shocks.17 Furthermore, MEI shocks play a minor role in business cy-
cles. They account for only 2.6 percent of fluctuations in output and 6.7 per-
cent of fluctuations in investments.
17Since Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) provide variance decompositions only in time domain,
we pick these numbers from the results of variance decompositions at eight quarters.
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1.4.2 Why are housing demand shocks not important?
Compared with the empirical exercises in Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) that
claims housing demand shocks are the primary driving force of business cy-
cles, our model is different in two respects. One is the nominal rigidities and
the other is the finite labor supply elasticity. The latter is key to our conclu-
sion.
TABLE 1.5: Variance decomposition at business cycle frequen-
cies: hypothetical cases I
Housing LTV MEI Tech- Mark- Other
demand nologies ups demands
Yobs baseline case 14.8 13.9 2.6 44.8 4.1 18.2
infinite Frisch elasticity 28.2 15.8 4.9 23.8 1.9 24.2
drop nominal frictions 14.5 15.4 0.1 59.1 0.0 10.2
Iobs baselinecase 23.0 18.8 6.7 18.1 4.7 27.2
infinite Frisch elasticity 30.5 17.6 7.9 9.4 1.3 32.3
drop nominal frictions 24.9 22.0 1.9 23.9 0.0 25.8
Cobs baseline case 5.9 9.4 4.7 44.3 3.7 29.8
infinite Frisch elasticity 17.0 10.0 2.9 43.4 3.4 21.8
drop nominal frictions 5.1 9.1 5.4 47.9 0.0 31.4
Ql,obs baseline case 74.9 3.2 2.9 10.5 1.0 6.7
infinite Frisch elasticity 76.3 3.3 1.2 8.6 0.7 9.4
drop nominal frictions 78.3 2.4 5.6 8.2 0.0 4.8
Bobs baseline case 25.5 47.0 10.7 6.5 1.5 7.9
infinite Frisch elasticity 32.6 41.7 2.9 5.0 0.9 16.0
drop nominal frictions 14.5 15.4 0.1 59.1 0.0 10.2
Note: “Other demands”, “Technologies”, and “Markups” correspond to the contributions
of “patience”, “monetary policy”, and “government expenditure” shocks, those of “neu-
tral” and “investment-specific” technology shocks, and those of “price” and “wage” markup
shocks, respectively. For computational details, see also the Note for Table 1.4. In the infinite
Frisch elasticity case, the model and parameters are same as the baseline case except for in-
verse Frisch elasticity c = 0. In the drop nominal frictions case, the model and the parameters
are the same as the baseline case except for the four parameters fxx, ixg for x = p, w. The
Calvo probabilities for price and wage changes are calibrated at 0.90 and the price and wage
indexations are calibrated at 0.0.
To analyze the role of these differences in specifications, Table 1.5 presents
variance decompositions in hypothetical economies with an infinite labor
supply elasticity and without nominal rigidities. The infinite Frisch elastic-
ity rows show that spillovers from housing demand becomes a major source
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of business cycles when the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is calibrated at
infinite as in Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013). Specifically, housing demand shocks
can account for 28.2 percent of output variations and 30.5 percent of invest-
ment variations. The contributions of housing demand shocks approach to
the results reported in Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013): 28.3 percent for output
variations and 38.7 percent for investment variations. In contrast, the drop
nominal frictions rows report that the contributions of housing demand shocks
are similar to those in the baseline case even when nominal price and wage
stickinesses are almost muted.18 These decompositions clearly indicate that
shifting housing demand matters for business cycles only when the labor
supply elasticity is infinitely high.
The higher Frisch elasticity leads to the greater substitution effects. A pos-
itive housing demand shock, which increases the land prices and available
funds by relaxing the collateral constraint, will strengthen the amplification
effect of the shock. In contrast, the lower Frisch elasticity, which is consistent
with micro evidence and estimated medium-scale DSGE models, leads to the
greater income effects. In this case, a shock amplification upon a positive
housing demand shock is limited even if rising collateral values increases
available funds through the relaxation of collateral constraint.
18Specifically, we set Calvo parameters of price and wage changes are 0.9 and indexation
parameters of price and wage are 0.0, as in the similar exercises of Smets and Wouters (2007).
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The upper panels of Figure 1.2 assist in understanding this point, by dis-
playing the impulse responses of selected variables to a positive housing
demand shock. Thick and broken lines correspond to the baseline and in-
finite Frisch elasticity cases, respectively. They show that output, investments,
and consumption move in tandem in a hump-shared pattern. Land prices
and credits also co-move procyclically. However, the amplification effects of
housing demand shocks are greater in the infinite Frisch elasticity case. The
peak responses of output and investments are approximately three times
greater that those in the baseline case. These responses are reflections of am-
plification effects of the higher Frisch elasticity.
1.4.3 Why are investment shocks not important?
Compared with the empirical exercises in Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tam-
balotti (2011) that claim MEI shocks are the primary driving force of business
cycles, we impose a collateral constraint on capital owners’ funding and add
land prices and credits to the dataset for estimation.
To understand the roles of collateral constraint, the lower panels of Figure
1.2 presents the impulse responses of variables to an MEI shock. An MEI
shock cannot reproduce the procyclical responses of land prices and credits
in the data shown in Figure 1.1 although this shock successfully generates
co-movements in output, investments, and consumption. In particular, the
response of credits is completely opposite for entire simulation periods.
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Contrasting credits’ responses are due to the combination of collateral
constraints and stock price responses. MEI shocks are supply shocks that
shift the marginal cost curve for building capital. For this reason, an MEI
shock lowers stock prices, which is the price of capital, while it has an expan-
sionary impact on production, investments, and consumption. Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011) admit this decline in stock prices during a
boom as a shortcoming of an MEI shock. Stock price movements are trans-
mitted into credit responses through the collateral constraint. The marked
line in the lower panel of Figure 1.2 illustrates the negative response of cred-
its almost disappears once the collateral constraint is dropped.
Table 1.6 presents variance decompositions in a hypothetical economy
without collateral constraints. The drop collateral constraints rows show that
spillovers from collateral-related shocks (i.e. housing demand and LTV shocks)
become smaller than those in the baseline case and MEI shocks become an
important driver of business cycles instead. Specifically, MEI shocks account
for 22.7 percent of output variations and 39.4 percent of investment vari-
ations, whereas housing demand shocks account for 5.7 percent of output
variations and 14.8 percent of investment variations.
In addition, we re-estimate the model without collateral constraint and
with dropping land prices and credits data.19 This alternative formulation is
similar to that of Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011). The drop collat-
eral const. and Bobs & Ql,obs rows in Table 1.6 report that MEI shocks account
for 44.7 and 73.6 percent of output and investment variations. The contri-
bution of MEI shocks increases and approximates to the results reported in
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011).
19To check the robustness of the results, we generate hypothetical data from the baseline
model with posterior mean of parameters and execute the same exercise. The variance de-
compositions are similar in the exercise with actual data and with hypothetical data.
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1.4.4 Robustness check: unconditional variance decomposi-
tion
For the exercises in Tables 1.5 and 1.6, we change one feature of the model
and keep all other parameters fixed at their estimated values. The purpose
of this exercise is to identify the effects of certain features “conditional on
the baseline estimation”. However, once one parameter is changed, the other
parameters could be affected in estimation. Then, this “conditional” vari-
ance decomposition may not be the same as the “unconditional” one. There-
fore, we re-estimate parameters with an infinite Frisch elasticity and without
collateral constraint, and calculate variance decompositions “uncondition-
ally”.20
Table 1.7 reports that unconditional variance decompositions are about
the same as the conditional variance decompositions presented in Table 1.5
and 1.6. It suggests that our conclusion is robust even after we re-estimate
the baseline model.
20We do not calculate the case without nominal frictions because it is hard to fit the model
to the dataset that includes price and wage inflations without nominal frictions.
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TABLE 1.7: Variance decomposition at business cycle frequen-
cies: unconditional comparison
Housing LTV MEI Tech- Mark- Other
demand nologies ups demands
Yobs baseline case 14.8 13.9 2.6 44.8 4.1 18.2
infinite Frisch elasticity 27.8 18.5 4.5 21.0 6.4 20.4
drop collateral constraint 6.8 0.0 35.4 36.2 9.5 10.1
Iobs baseline case 23.0 18.8 6.7 18.1 4.7 27.2
infinite Frisch elasticity 31.2 20.7 7.8 9.5 4.0 25.6
drop collateral constraint 13.9 0.0 57.0 12.0 7.8 7.5
Cobs baseline case 5.9 9.4 4.7 44.3 3.7 29.8
infinite Frisch elasticity 17.0 12.3 5.5 31.8 12.6 19.2
drop collateral constraint 1.2 0.0 25.9 34.7 10.0 25.7
Ql,obs baseline case 74.9 3.2 2.9 10.5 1.0 6.7
infinite Frisch elasticity 76.6 3.6 1.8 7.0 2.7 7.6
drop collateral constraint 73.3 0.0 8.6 9.1 2.8 5.5
Bobs baseline case 25.5 47.0 10.7 6.5 1.5 7.9
infinite Frisch elasticity 31.4 43.3 4.4 5.8 0.4 14.1
drop collateral constraint 34.7 49.3 4.6 5.6 1.6 3.2
Note: For computational details, see also the Note for Table 1.4. In the infinite Frisch elasticity
case, the model is re-estimated with calibrated at c = 0. In the drop collateral const. case, the
model is re-estimated with calibrated at q¯ = 0.001. Respective shocks are the same as those
in Table 1.5.
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1.5 In Closing
Studies like that of Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) argue that spillovers from
land-price fluctuations is the major determinant of output and investment
movements at business cycle frequencies. Other studies such as Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) stress the importance of investment shocks
as a determinant of business cycles. To compare these views within one uni-
fied framework, this study introduces land as a collateral asset in investment
financing in a standard New Keynesian DSGE model, estimates it, and iden-
tifies the major source of U.S. business cycle fluctuations.
The implications are as follows. First, neither housing demand shocks,
which is the major determinant of land-price fluctuations, nor MEI shocks
are the major source of business cycle fluctuations. Our model suggests that
technology shocks are the primary determinant of business cycles. Second,
we clarify that the main findings of Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) crucially de-
pends on the specification of households’ utility function. Third, MEI shocks
play a minor role in business cycles. Since MEI shocks fail to reproduce busi-
ness cycle co-movements between output and credits in the model with col-
lateral constraint, they cannot be the principle determinant of business cycles
when identified with a model of collateral constraint and credits data.
We raise several caveats. First of all, our model abstracts housing expen-
diture in construction, following Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) for the purpose
of making comparison easier. This simplification may be justifiable because
most of the housing price movements are attributable to the land price move-
ments. However, as suggested in Davis and Heathcote (2007), the impor-
tance of housing investments at business cycle frequency is more than non-
negligible. Studies in the model with land prices, residential investments in
structure, and collateral constraint are the important subject. Second, our
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results find that exogenous LTV shocks are also the important factor for out-
put and investment fluctuations, implying that financial intermediaries play
a certain role in business cycles. Recent studies such as Justiniano, Primiceri,
and Tambalotti (2016) challenge to clarify this role of financial intermediaries
in a DSGE model with a housing sector. This line of research is important and
promising. Third, we assumed that the collateral constraint always binds. As
Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017) suggest, an occasionally binding constraint
creates asymmetric responses and might deliver different results concerning
the source of business cycles. This issue is also a promising avenue for future
research.
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Chapter 2
Flattening of the Phillips Curve
under Low Trend Inflation
1
2.1 Introduction
It is a conventional view that the output-inflation correlation, i.e., the Phillips
curve, is flatter under low trend inflation. Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988)
(hereafter BMR) suggest that the slope of the Phillips curve becomes flatter
when the average rate of inflation is low. Benati (2007) has statistically veri-
fied BMR’s argument using data from OECD countries.
However, standard sticky price models, which occupy the predominant
position in recent monetary policy analyses,2 fail to account for these empiri-
cal facts. Notably, Bakhshi et al. (2007) demonstrate that the slope of the new
Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) becomes steeper under lower trend infla-
tion.3 This theoretical implication of trend inflation is not consistent with the
empirical facts.
1The chapter is the revised version of the article in Economics Letters, vol.132 (c).
2Sticky price models with the Calvo (1983) type infrequent price adjustments and mo-
nopolistic competition are widely used in this literature (e.g. Woodford (2003)) and policy
analysis (c.f. Linde, Smets, and Wouters (2016).
3Ascari (2004) derives the New Keynesian Phillips curve under non-zero trend inflation.
Recent developments in this field are summarized in Ascari and Sbordone (2014)
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This study demonstrates how to resolve this discrepancy between empir-
ical findings and the implications derived from standard models. Here, what
we consider important is the curvature of the demand curve.
Let’s consider a price-setting problem. If firms cannot reset their prices
every period, they have to think about not only the present demand sched-
ule but also the future demand schedule. This issue is more troublesome un-
der the positive trend inflation because their relative prices go down while
firms cannot reset prices. Now, suppose that firms face a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) demand aggregator, which is most commonly used in
standard sticky price models. In this situation, the demand curve becomes
steeper as relative prices decline. Then, it is optimal for firms to be more
forward-looking under higher trend inflation. Hence, reset prices are less
sensitive to current economic conditions and the slope of the Phillips curve
becomes flatter.
Suppose that price-setting firms can reset prices only infrequently and
face a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand curve, which is most
commonly used in standard sticky price models. In this situation, demand
becomes more price sensitive as the relative price declines. Then, firms are
more forward-looking under higher trend inflation. Hence, reset prices are
less sensitive to current economic conditions and the slope of the Phillips
curve becomes flatter.
In contrast, if firms face a kinked demand aggregator, which was first
formulated by Sweezy (1939) and revived by Kimball (1995) in the context
of modern dynamic stochastic equilibrium models, the demand curve be-
comes flatter as relative prices decline. Then, it is optimal for firms to be less
forward-looking under higher trend inflation and the slope of the Phillips
curve becomes steeper as trend inflation increases.
Concerning the flatter slope of the Phillips curve under lower inflation,
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past literature has emphasized the role of time-varying price rigidities.4 BMR
and Romer (1990) claim that the frequency of price adjustments is lower in
an environment of low inflation. Bakhshi, Khan, and Rudolf (2007) apply
Romer (1990)’s concept to the typical sticky price model and derive the flat-
ter slope of the Phillips curve under lower inflation. As an alternative ar-
gument, Tobin (1972) and Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) claim that the
unemployment rate is apt to increase during a low-inflation period because
nominal prices and nominal wages tend to be more rigid downwards than
upwards. Consequently, the Phillips curve flattens when the inflation rate is
near zero. Further, some studies regard monetary policy credibility as an im-
portant factor. For example, Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin (2010) argue that the
Phillips curve becomes flat because of changes in monetary policy behavior
and effect of these changes on expectations.
Our approach complements these lines of research, however, differs from
them in that we focus on demand behavior instead of price-setting friction,
wage-setting behavior, or monetary policy credibility.
For the ease of explanation, we first consider the pricing decision of firms
in a partial equilibrium setting and indicate that the curvature of demand
curve has important implications for firms’ pricing behavior under trend in-
flation. Further, we extend the analysis to the general equilibrium setting
and perform stochastic simulations. By doing so, we demonstrate that the
Phillips curve is flatter under lower trend inflation if the demand curve is
kinked; however, it is steeper if the demand curve is CES.
4Some studies consider the recent flattening of the Phillips curve observed in indus-
trial countries is attributable to the globalization and increased competition (e.g., Sbordone
(2009)). However, the evidence based on the micro data is not necessarily supportive for this
hypothesis. For example, Gaiotti (2010) reports that the link between capacity utilization
and prices is not necessarily strong for firms that are more exposed to foreign competition.
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2.2 A two-period sticky price setting with positive
inflation: The partial equilibrium approach
Consider a two-period version of a price setting problem. A fraction of mo-
nopolistic competitive firms indexed as z 2 (0, 1) pick prices P(z). The firms
cannot change their prices for two periods.5
Now, we will consider the demand curve that pricing firms face. Let an in-
creasing concave function D() be a homothetic demand aggregator. House-
holds solve a expenditure minimization problem: minC(z)
R 1
0 P(z)C(z)dz sub-
ject to
R 1
0 D(C(z)/C)dz = 1, where C is the total consumption implicitly de-
fined by the demand aggregator D. Kimball (1995) presumes a function D()
suffices D(1) = 1, D()0 > 0, and D()00 < 0. The aggregate price level, P,
is implicitly defined by
R 1
0 (
P(z)
P )(
C(z)
C )dz = 1. The expenditure minimization
problem can be solved to obtain the following demand curve: C(z)C = d(
P(z)
l ),
where l is a Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. Dotsey and King (2005)
give a specific function form of D() as
D

Ct(z)
Ct

=
1
(1+ y)g

(1+ y)

Ct(z)
Ct

  y
g
 

1+
1
(1+ y)g

,
where g  [e(1 + y)  1]/[e(1 + y)]; e is the parameter of demand elastic-
ity and assumed to be greater than one; y is the parameter of curvature of
demand curve. In this function form, we have one additional parameter, y,
compared to the CES demand aggregator. This parameter determines the
curvature of the demand curve.
5Ascari (2000) employs a similar two-period model and analyzes how sensitivities of new
reset wages depend on trend inflation.
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Solving the cost minimization problem, we obtain the following demand
curve,
Ct(z)
Ct
=
1
1+ y
"
Pt(z)
lt
 e(1+y)
+ y
#
. (2.1)
lt
Pt
=
"Z 1
0

Pt(z)
Pt
 g
g 1
dz
# g 1
g
.
When y = 0, a demand curve exhibits constant elasticity, as the CES formula-
tion; When y < 0, each firm faces a quasi-kinked demand curve, á la Kimball
(1995).
Figure 2.1 presents the demand curve under respective parameter values.
In the case of y = 0, the demand curve is equivalent to the CES. In the cases
of y =  2, 8.4, 16, the curvature of the demand curve overturns, reflect-
ing the kinked demand property of the Kimball-Dotsey-King type demand
aggregator.
FIGURE 2.1: Demand curve: CES versus Kink
The Dotsey-King’s specification has a nice property. The aggregate price
index has a specified function form as following,
Pt =
1
1+ y
Z 1
0
Pt(z)
g
g 1 dz
 g 1
g
+
y
1+ y
Z 1
0
Pt(z)dz. (2.2)
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(2.2) shows that the aggregate price index is expressed as a linear combina-
tion of the price index that corresponds to the CES demand aggregator and
the simple average of individual prices.
Given the demand curve defined above, we will examine the firms’ pric-
ing problem. Specifically, a firm z choose Pt(z) to maximize the following
profits over two periods:

Pt(z)
Pt
  MC
n
t
Pt

d

Pt(z)
Pt
Qt

Yt
+ bEt

Lt,t+1

Pt(z)
Pt+1
  MC
n
t+1
Pt+1

d

Pt(z)
Pt
Qt+1
pt+1

Yt+1

,
(2.3)
where Qt+n  Pt+n/lt+n, pt+1  Pt+1/Pt, and b is a discount factor (b < 1).
MCnt+n, Yt+n, and Lt,t+n are the nominal marginal cost, aggregated output,
and stochastic discount factor at time t + n, respectively. Et[] is an expecta-
tion operator based on the information set at time t.
Assuming that the utility function is specified as Ut = log(Ct) and Ct =
Yt, the first-order condition of a firm z can be summarized as follows:
Pt
Pt
= Qt (MCt   ht)| {z }
variables at t
+(1 Qt)Et [pt+1 (MCt+1   ht+1)]| {z }
variables at t+1
, (2.4)
where Pt is the optimal price and MCt = MCnt /Pt. ht+n is the inversed
price sensitivity of demand: ht+n  dtd0t and d
0
t+n = ¶d(xt+n)/¶(Pt(z)/Pt).
The inter-temporal weight in (2.4), takes the following form: Qt  d0t/[d0t +
Et(
b
pt+1
d0t+1)].
(2.4) suggests that the optimal relative price is the weighted sum of the
current and future variables. Furthermore, the concurrent relationship be-
tween the marginal cost and optimal prices depends on the weight, Qt. It
is clearer when we log-linearize (2.4) around the steady state and derive the
coefficient of the optimal price to changes in marginal costs: d(P

t /Pt)
M¯Cdmˆct = Q¯,
where xˆt represents a log-deviation of x from the steady state, x¯.
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Using the specific form of the demand curve in (2.1), we obtain
Q¯ =
1
1+ bp¯[e(1+y) 2]
. (2.5)
(2.5) means that the optimal price’s responsiveness to marginal costs are
determined by trend inflation, two parameters of the demand curve, and
discount rate. Specific implications of (2.5) can be summarized as follows.
If the demand curve is CES (y = 0), then the optimal price is more re-
sponsive to changes in current marginal cost under lower trend inflation as
long as the demand elasticity is e > 2; this condition is quite wide since the
steady-state demand elasticity is calibrated as around 7 in many previous
works. In contrast, if the demand curve is kinked (y < 0), the optimal price
is less responsive to changes in current marginal costs under lower trend in-
flation as long as e(y+ 1) < 2, which is also consistent with wide range of
realistic parameter values.
Figure 2.2 presents a graphical interpretation of the above results. The
inter-temporal weight, Qt, comprises the demand curve’s current and future
slope. If current demand is more price sensitive than inflation-adjusted fu-
ture demand, the inter-temporal weight increases. As illustrated in the left-
hand side of Figure 2.2, when firms face a kinked demand curve, they expect
less price sensitive demand in the future (jd0t+1/pt+1j < jd0tj) under higher
trend inflation. Hence, in case of the kinked demand, the reset price is more
responsive to changes in current marginal costs under lower trend inflation.
Pricing behavior is different when firms face a CES demand curve. As il-
lustrated in the right-hand side of Figure 2.2, the higher trend inflation could
result in more forward-looking pricing (jd0t+1/pt+1j > jd0tj). In case of CES
demand, the reset price is less responsive to changes in current marginal costs
under lower trend inflation.
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FIGURE 2.2: Demand schedule under non-zero trend inflation
2.3 An infinite-period sticky price model with pos-
itive inflation: General equilibrium approach
This section studies the slope of the reduced-form Phillips curve under dif-
ferent trend inflation by simulation, using a standard New Keynesian type
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The brief description of the
model is as follows.
2.3.1 The Model
We assume that any price-setter indexed by z 2 [0, 1] is a monopolistic com-
petitor that produces a differentiated intermediate good z. A wholesaler pro-
duces a final good, using differentiated intermediate goods as inputs and
sells it to households in a perfectly competitive market. The production func-
tion of the wholesaler is equivalent to the consumption aggregator of D in the
previous section.
2.3. An infinite-period sticky price model with positive inflation: General
equilibrium approach
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Households
A representative household’s objective function is defined as follows:
Et
¥
å
j=0
bj ln(Ct+j)  Nt+j,
where Nt is labor input.
The contemporaneous budget constraint for the representative household
is
PtCt + Bt WtNt +Pt + Rt 1Bt 1,
where Rt, Bt, Wt, and Pt are a price of one period contingent claim bond,
amount of the bond, nominal wage, and lump-sum transfer and firms profits,
respectively.
Producers
A monopolistically competitive producer sets its price in a Calvo (1983) fash-
ion such that when a producer gets an opportunity to reset the price at time
t, the producer can choose the optimal price to maximize the discounted
sum of future profits, as in (2.6). The price-reset probability is denoted as
0 < 1  a < 1.
Et
¥
å
j=0
(ab)jLt,t+j
" 
Pt(i)
Pt+j
  Wt+j(i)
Pt+j
!#
Yt+j(i) (2.6)
The production function is linear in labor input: Yt(i) = Nt(i). Market
clearing condition holds: Yt = Ct.
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Monetary Authority
The monetary authority follows a Taylor-type policy rule with inertia, that
is, the monetary authority gradually adjusts the nominal interest rate in re-
sponse to the deviation of inflation and output from steady-state values.
Rnt
R¯n
=

Rnt 1
R¯n
r "pt
p¯
fp Yt
Y¯
fy#1 r
, (2.7)
where X¯ denotes the steady state value of X.
2.3.2 Simulation
After solving the agents’ optimization problems and log-linearizing equilib-
rium conditions, we generate hypothetical equilibrium paths of 500 periods,
in which the only source of equilibrium dynamics is the exogenous monetary
policy shock. For each simulation, we change the combination of the trend
inflation({0%, 4%, 8%}) and type of demand function ({ CES, Kink}).
The other parameters are calibrated as follows. The subjective discount
factor is b = 0.99. The probability of no price change is a = 0.6. Following
Levin, Lopez-Salido, and Yun (2007), the parameters of demand elasticity
and demand curvature are set as e = 7 and y =  8.4, respectively. Finally,
the monetary policy rule’s coefficients on output and inflation are fy = 0.5
and fp = 1.5, respectively. The lag coefficient of the policy rule is r = 0.8.
Figure 2.3 indicates the scatter plots of simulated values of inflation and
output, that is, the simulated Phillips curves. The left-hand and right-hand
side panels correspond to the cases that employ the CES demand curve and
the kinked demand curve, respectively. Three types of scatter plots in each
panel correspond to the cases of different trend inflation: 0, 4, and 8% per
annum.
2.3. An infinite-period sticky price model with positive inflation: General
equilibrium approach
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FIGURE 2.3: The reduced-form Phillips curve
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Note: Inflation and output are log-deviations from respective steady states.
In the figure, we can see the clear difference between CES and kinked
demand cases. In the CES demand cases, the Phillips curve becomes steeper
as trend inflation decreases. In contrast, in the kinked demand cases, the
Phillips curve becomes flatter as trend inflation decreases. The results that
use kinked demand curve are consistent with the empirical work by Benati
(2007).
As suggested in Bakhshi et al. (2007), the canonical sticky price model
cannot explain this flatter slope of the Phillips curve under lower inflation.
Our analysis is successful in explaining this discrepancy between the stan-
dard sticky price models and the empirical evidence. Notably, the mecha-
nism behind our results is different from Bakhshi, Khan, and Rudolf (2007),
which stress the role of time-varying nominal rigidities in the spirit of BMR
or Romer (1990). We have indicated that the kinked demand can also explain
the flatter slope of the Phillips curve under lower trend inflation.
Figure 2.4 presents the simulated Phillips curve under different parameter
values of demand curvature y =  2 and y =  16. The left-hand size panel
suggests that the steeper Phillips curve under lower trend inflation, which is
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a problematic feature of standard sticky price models, will be fixed only if
we postulate a small degree of non-constant elasticity y =  2. Further, our
main result and two panels in this Figure show that the curvature of demand
curve can be the crucial factor to determine the slope of the Phillips curve
under variable trend inflation rates.
FIGURE 2.4: The reduced-form Phillips curve: alternative y
Note: Inflation and output are log-deviations from respective steady states.
2.4 In Closing
This study challenges to fill the gap between the implications of standard
sticky price models and empirical facts regarding the Phillips curve under
low trend inflation. We demonstrate that introducing the "smoothed out
kinked" demand curve (Kimball (1995)) can offer an explanation of the flat-
tened Phillips curve under conditions of lower trend inflation. In the case of
the kinked demand curve, the elasticity of substitution is non-constant. Un-
der positive trend inflation, forward-looking firms expect that the demand
would be price sensitive in the future and their pricing behavior become front
loading. Consequently, the inflation is less sensitive to current economic ac-
tivities and more exerted by the prospect of the future economy.
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There still remains much room for further exploration. This study takes
a time-dependent nominal friction as given. However, nominal frictions are
not limited to the time–dependent ones. It is still ambiguous whether the
conclusion set forth in this study holds for model with other types of nomi-
nal frictions such as menu-cost pricing. It would be an interesting topic for
future research to study the effect of the demand curvature and trend infla-
tion under different nominal frictions.
Much room is also left for empirical exploration. In the simulation section,
this study uses a simple three-equation model and calibrates parameters to
focus on the theoretical possibilities. As a next step, it would be interesting
to expand the model to a medium-scale model that can capture the actual
business cycle dynamics and to estimate parameters using actual data.
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Chapter 3
Shock Size Matters for US
Monetary policy: Menu-cost
Pricing, Information Effect, or
Selective Gradualism?
3.1 Introduction
Sometimes, central banks initiate major policy changes. Is a big monetary
policy change more powerful than an incremental one? This study investi-
gates whether shock size matters for the US monetary policy.
It is unobvious that a large monetary policy shock is more effective than
a small shock. For instance, typical menu-cost models imply that a large
monetary policy shock is less powerful than a small shock. In these models,
most firms reset prices after a large monetary policy shock; thus, the impacts
on economic fundamentals would be small.1 In contrast, some theoretical
1Golosov and Lucas (2007) employed a menu cost model with normally distributed id-
iosyncratic shocks and indicated that monetary policy slightly impacts economic fundamen-
tals. Midrigan (2011) used a menu cost model with a fat-tailed distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks and claimed that monetary policy is considerably non-neutral. Both researchers have
assumed that monetary policy shocks are small.
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studies such as those by Diamond (1982) have inferred that an active pol-
icy intervention stimulates aggregate economic activities and leads to better
equilibrium outcomes. Although this topic has potential implications for un-
derstanding the hidden economic structure, it has not been thoroughly stud-
ied.
To address this issue, this study employs the local projection method of
Jorda (2005) and estimates the impulse response function, allowing for pa-
rameters to depend on the size of shocks. The monetary policy shocks are
identified following the study by Romer and Romer (2004). The estimated
impacts on major economic variables clearly demonstrate that the shock size
matters for the US monetary policy effects.
This study’s findings are summarized as follows. First, the main result of
the analysis indicates that a large monetary policy shock is less effective than
a small shock. The finding is relevant for the classification of large and small
shocks, outliers, and market disruptions during the Volker’s chairmanship
as well as the distribution of contractionary and expansionary shocks.
Second, this study examines three hypotheses concerning the asymmet-
ric responses to large and small shocks. It finds that the monetary policy
design is the relevant source of the phenomenon. The first hypothesis to be
examined is with regard to menu cost pricing. As described above, typical
menu cost models suggest that a large monetary policy shock considerably
impacts aggregate prices; however, the impact on economic fundamentals
is almost neutral because most firms find it optimal to adjust prices. How-
ever, our result contradicts the theoretical prediction of menu cost models,
indicating that a large shock has a weak impact on economic fundamen-
tals and inflation. The second hypothesis concerns the information effect.
As indicated by Romer and Romer (2000), the monetary policy shock con-
veys information about the future prospects of monetary policy and other
economic fundamentals. If households and firms update their beliefs about
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potential growth rates with greater sensitivity to a larger monetary policy
shock, then monetary policy effects would be asymmetric according to the
shock size. However, our regression analysis using survey expectations de-
nies this possibility. Finally, the third hypothesis covers the selective gradu-
alism of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve basically adjusts policy rates
gradually, but it selectively deviates from a gradualist approach if necessary.
As stressed by Woodford (2003), a commitment to gradual interest rate ad-
justment can significantly impact long-term interest rates and economic fun-
damentals through the expectations channel, while a monetary policy shock
that is perceived to be temporary cannot. By performing impulse response
matching with a standard medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) model, this study suggests that the main result is consistent
with the “selective” gradualism of the Federal Reserve.
Third, this study revisits several state dependencies of monetary policy
effects through the lens of shock size distribution. One is the dependency on
uncertainty. Real option effects on business investments (Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) and Bloom (2009)), households’ precautionary savings (Deaton (1991)
and Carroll (1992)), and financial institutions’ behavior (Christiano, Motto,
and Rostagno (2014)) suggest that increased uncertainty reduces firms’ and
households’ responsiveness to exogenous shocks. Aastveit, Natvik, and Sola
(2017) and Castelnuovo and Pellegrino (2018) provide evidence that the ef-
fect of monetary policy is asymmetric and less powerful under higher uncer-
tainty. Our result reveals that the asymmetric effect appears only when all the
monetary policy shocks are included in the empirical analysis but disappears
once a small number of huge monetary policy shocks are excluded. This con-
clusion stresses the importance of controlling the shock size distribution in
the empirical analysis of the monetary policy effect.
Another state dependency re-examined here is that on economic growth
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rates. It is a conventional wisdom among practitioners that monetary pol-
icy is more effective during an expansionary phase of the economy. Previ-
ous studies on this and adjacent matters2 have found mixed results. In line
with the recent studies by Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016), we find that the
monetary policy is effective when the economic growth rate is high, and this
conclusion is robust even after controlling for the shock size.
This study is a part of the literature that uncovers nonlinearity of the mon-
etary policy effects but differs from previous studies in that its focus is on the
shock size. Among others, our study is close to that by Ravn and Sola (2004).
Ravn and Sola (2004) use a time series procedure related to that of Barro
(1977) and Mishkin (1982). They examine the contemporaneous impact of
monetary policy shocks on output and find that only a small negative shock
on the federal funds rate has a real effect. Furthermore, they conjecture that
a menu cost model can offer a reasonable explanation regarding their find-
ing. Our study extends the findings of the study by Ravn and Sola (2004) in
several dimensions. First, employing a variant of the local projection method
of Jorda (2005), it estimates dynamic impulse responses over long horizons,
which are more common and pertain to the central issue discussed in the lit-
erature.3 Second, this study estimates impulse responses of the output (pro-
duction) and other important variables such as inflation and term spreads of
interest rates. This point enables us to explore the specific mechanism behind
the asymmetry and helps discover that the relevant mechanism is not menu
cost pricing but the monetary policy framework. The hypothesis concerning
the information effects of Romer and Romer (2000), Nakamura and Steins-
son (2013), and Jarocinski and Karadi (2018) are checked as a potential cause
2e.g. Evans (1986), Weise (1999),Thoma (1994),Lo and Piger (2005),Garcia and Schaller
(2002), and Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016).
3Compared with a structural vector autoregression model frequently used to estimate im-
pulse responses in the monetary policy analysis, the local projection adopted in this article
has several advantages: it does not impose any restrictions on the functional form of dy-
namic shock propagation and requires only a small number of parameters to be estimated.
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of the asymmetry. Another related study is that by Tenreyro and Thwaites
(2016), which suggests the possibility that monetary policy effects might be
different depending on the shock size. However, their primary interest is the
state dependency on the economic growth rate. Our analysis expands their
work and explores a suggested direction intensively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents
the econometric framework of this study. Section 3.3 outlines the main result
and robustness checks. Section 3.4 investigates the cause of shock size depen-
dency. Section 3.5 reconsiders other state dependencies of monetary policy
effects through the lens of shock size. Section 3.6 presents the conclusion.
3.2 Econometric framework
3.2.1 The model
The empirical methodology is based on the local projection model of Jorda
(2005). We expand it to estimate parameters separately for large shock and
small shock states.4 In this framework, we first identify monetary policy
shocks, and then, estimate impulse responses of target variables.
Linear and regime-switching Romer regression
Romer and Romer (2004) propose a new measure of monetary policy shocks
as residuals of the following monetary policy reaction function:
DFFt = k0Xt + et. (3.1)
4Similar framework has been employed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Ramey
and Zubairy (2018), and Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) to investigate the state-dependent
effects of fiscal and monetary policies.
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where FFt denotes an intended federal funds rate derived narratively by
Romer and Romer (2004), and the covariate matrix Xt includes Federal Re-
serve’s internal forecasts prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC). Intended funds rates enable us to identify consistent policy shocks
regardless of the policy instrument in effect at each particular time. Further,
the Fed’s internal forecasts help to bleach the systematic responses of mone-
tary policy to the current and future prospect of the economy.
The hypothesis to be examined in this study is that the economy responds
differently to large and small shocks. Accordingly, this study adopts two
types of policy reaction functions. One is Romer’s original linear regression
model of (3.1). After obtaining monetary policy shocks, this study stratifies
them into large and small shocks by setting a certain threshold. For con-
venience, this study introduces a binary state variable st that represents the
current state of the shock size: st = 0 for small shocks and st = 1 for large
ones.
Another policy reaction function is a regime-switching one. Monetary
policy shocks may switch between high and low volatility processes. Then,
economic agents would change their behavior under high and low volatility
regimes. Consequently, economic responses to large and small shocks could
be observed differently. As a specific functional form, this study adopts the
following regime-switching (RS) Romer regression model,
DFFt = k(st)0Xt + e˜t, st = f0, 1g,
e˜t  N (0, se˜(st)) , (3.2)
p =
264 p0,0 1  p1,1
1  p0,0 p1,1
375 ,
where parameters fk(st), se˜(st)g are different depending on the state st; p
denotes the matrix of state transition probabilities. Hereafter, we call et and
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e˜t linear and RS Romer shocks, respectively.
Impulse response function
The impulse response of variable zt at h periods ahead in state s = f0, 1g to
an exogenous monetary policy shock is estimated as bsh,
zt+h =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
dt + I (st)

a0h + b
0
het + g
00xt

+ [1  I (st)]

a1h + b
1
het + g
10xt

+ ht (linear Romer shock),
dt + q (st)

a0h + b
0
he˜t + g
00xt

+ [1  q (st)]

a1h + b
1
he˜t + g
10xt

+ h˜t (RS Romer shock),
(3.3)
where I(st) is an indicator function of small shocks that takes a value of 1
when the shock size is small and 0 otherwise; q(st) is a probability of low
volatility regime; t denotes a time trend; ash is a constant; and xt is the vector
of covariates. In (3.3), the coefficients of large shocks and small shocks are
estimated separately.
We stuck the local projection equation of (3.3) for h = 0, 1, ...H and ap-
ply the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to calculate the smoothed im-
pulse response functions.5 The dependent variables are industrial produc-
tion, housing, real consumption, inflation, and interest rates (i.e., term spreads).
One caveat when performing time series analysis using Romer and Romer
(2004)-type monetary policy shocks is that the identified shocks are available
only for the months with FOMC meetings, which ”Greenbook” is prepared
for6. Intermittent data is not suitable for standard time series analysis, such
as the estimation of (3.3).
5Although the SUR does not improve the efficiency of (3.3) because the regressors are
identical for each equation, it is useful to calculate the distribution of functions of smoothed
parameters.
6Romer and Romer (2004) fill the shocks with zero for the months without FOMC meet-
ings. Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) avoid this issue by converting monthly data to quarterly
data.
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To cope with the discrepancy between the model and the data, this study
constructs dataset in a panel format, in which t represents intermittent months
of FOMC meetings and h represents H consecutive months after a period t
(c.f. Table 3.1). By splitting intermittent t and continuous h, we can estimate
the model in a consistent manner. Hereafter, the left-hand side variable of
(3.3) is denoted as zt,h instead of zt+h.
TABLE 3.1: Illustrative example: panel structure of dataset
Date of FOMC meeting et zt zt,1 zt,2    zt,H xt
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
December 21, 1999       
February 2, 2000       
March 21, 2000       
May 16, 2000       
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
The panel-formatted dataset also enables us to utilize stratification in esti-
mation. Traditional time series analysis (e.g., vector autoregression models)
requires a continuous time series of data and has difficulties estimating a
model when some of the consecutive time series data are excluded. How-
ever, the local projection method is easy to accommodate with stratification
in estimation when combined with a panel-formatted dataset. We will use
this benefit in the latter section.
3.2.2 Data source and sample period
This study estimates the impulse responses of industrial production, housing
construction, real consumption, inflation rate, and term spreads. The data is
downloaded through the FRED API provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis. Inflation is the monthly change in the personal consumer expendi-
ture (PCE) core deflator. Term spreads are the differentials between 10-year
government bond yields and effective federal funds rates. Housing is the
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logarithm of housing starts. Industrial production and real consumption are
also in logarithm. As for the policy reaction function, this study employs the
dataset originally developed by Romer and Romer (2004) and extended and
shared by Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016).
The sample period spans March 1969 to December 2007.7 It does not in-
clude the crisis period around the collapse of Lehman Brothers because the
impact of monetary policy during this period could have been different from
those of monetary policies during other normal periods.
3.3 Shock Size and Monetary Policy Effects
This section first outlines the estimated monetary policy shocks and our main
results. Thereafter, it examines their robustness.
3.3.1 Estimated monetary policy shocks
Figure 3.1 presents the estimated monetary policy shocks.8 Linear and RS
Romer shocks move in tandem. The correlation between these shocks is
0.954. Both shocks fluctuate around zero, by definition, but show large spikes
at certain times. Huge shocks were concentrated during the early part of
Chairman Volker’s monetary targeting periods.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3.2 report that 27 shocks have standard
deviation greater than 1.5 over the entire sample period. In the following
empirical exercises featuring linearly identified Romer shocks, this study de-
fines large shocks as those with standard deviation greater than 1.5, consider-
ing the balance between relative shock size and the number of observations.
The robustness of this definition will be examined in the following section.
7Since the length of impulse responses is 60 months, the monetary policy shocks end in
December 2002.
8Our linearly identified Romer shocks are quite similar to Romer and Romer (2004)’s
shocks. The correlation between the Romer’s shocks and those in this study is 0.979. The
correlation is calculated using estimated shocks from March 1969 to December 1996.
54
Chapter 3. Shock Size Matters for US Monetary policy: Menu-cost Pricing,
Information Effect, or Selective Gradualism?
In the exercises featuring RS Romer shocks, 85 shocks are estimated to have
been in the large shock (high volatility) regime.9 The standard deviations
of shocks are 0.368 for linear Romer shocks and 0.357 for RS Romer shocks.
The Federal Reserve tends to change policy rates by 0.25 or 0.50 percent. The
estimated standard deviations lie in the midst of these values.
Contractionary shocks are considered to be more powerful than expan-
sionary ones, as implied in the famous phrase, “cannot push on a string”. If
these shocks are more common in either small or large shocks, our estimated
results could be biased. However, the 5th column of Table 3.2 shows that the
number of positive and negative shocks are almost equivalent in both large
and small shock clusters. It is unlikely to be a source of asymmetry between
large and small shocks.
FIGURE 3.1: Romer and Romer [2004] type monetary policy
shocks
Note: The probability of large shocks is right-hand-side scaled. Shaded area denotes Vol-
cker’s monetary targeting period between October 1979 and October 1982.
3.3.2 Main results: the shock size matters for monetary pol-
icy effects
Figure 3.2 reports impulse responses to monetary policy shocks. Solid and
broken lines represent the cases of linear and RS Romer shocks, respectively.
9Specifically, the probability of the high volatility regime exceeds 50%.
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TABLE 3.2: Descriptive statistics of monetary policy shocks
N N2sejej N3sejej Positive shocks Mean S.D. Max Min
(% of total)
Linear Romer shocks
Overall 314 14 5 50.0 -0.008 0.368 1.783 -3.361
Small shocks 287 - - 50.2 -0.005 0.191 0.502 -0.534
Large shocks 27 14 5 48.2 -0.036 1.106 1.783 -3.361
RS Romer shocks
Overall 314 13 6 51.0 -0.007 0.357 1.490 -3.212
Small shocks 229 - - 52.0 0.006 0.156 0.673 -0.465
Large shocks 85 13 6 48.2 -0.041 0.637 1.490 -3.212
Note: Large shocks are shocks greater than 1.5 se for linear Romer shocks and shocks in the
large shock regime (probability is greater than 50%) for RS Romer shocks.
The first column provides the estimated responses without making a distinc-
tion between large and small shocks. The second and third columns report
the responses to small and large shocks, respectively. The fourth column
is the differential between the second and third columns. The impulse re-
sponses are three-horizon centered moving averages and are normalized to
generate an initial 1 percentage point rise in the federal funds rate.
The first three rows of Figure 3.2 report that production, housing, and
consumption decline following a positive monetary policy shock. In the lin-
ear model that does not distinguish between large and small shocks, the pro-
duction hits the bottom approximately after two years, as suggested in pre-
vious studies (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) and Romer
and Romer (2004)). Production responses to contractionary shocks after two
years are -3.72 percent (linear Romer shocks) and -3.29 percent (RS Romer
shocks). These values are similar to those in the study by Romer and Romer
(2004) (-4.3 percent) even though the sample periods of both the studies are
different.
The second and third columns clearly indicate that the impacts of large
shocks are significantly attenuated. The bottom of production responses to
large shocks is less than one-half of those made to small shocks. As for linear
Romer shocks, production responses to small shocks are -8.08 percent and
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FIGURE 3.2: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
Note: Impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock are presented with 90
percent confidence intervals. Thick and broken lines correspond to linear and RS Romer
shocks.
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those to large shocks are -2.00 percent after two years. The difference between
large and small shocks in the fourth column is significant around the bottom
of the responses. In the case of RS Romer shocks, the quantitative impacts on
production are quite similar. The contrasts between large and small shocks
are evident in housing and consumption; however, the confidence intervals
are wider in the case of RS Romer shocks.
For inflation and interest rates provided in the fourth and fifth rows, the
impulse responses to large shocks are also weak. Inflation starts to turn
significantly negative after 1.5 to 2 years for all shocks in the first column
and for small shocks in the second column. This pattern is consistent with
that in the aforementioned previous studies. However, inflation responses to
large shocks are indistinct and remain close to zero. Term spreads increase
to around 2 (6) percent after 2 years in the case of small linear (RS) Romer
shocks but stay under 0.5 percent in the case of large shocks. We will dis-
cuss the implications of both inflation and term-spread reactions in the next
section.
3.3.3 Robustness check: Volker’s chairmanship, outliers, and
other factors
Several concerns could be raised regarding the main results. First, large
shocks are concentrated in the early period of the Chairperson Volker’s monetary-
targeting regime. Large shocks may not be the source of ineffective mon-
etary policy but rather outcomes of an alternative monetary policy regime.
To check the robustness of the main results, the model is re-estimated af-
ter excluding observations from October 1979 to May 1981, which is the
same as the period of Romer and Romer (2004)’s robustness check. Our
panel-formatted dataset can easily accommodate partial exclusions within
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the dataset. Thick lines in Figure 3.2 indicate that small shocks have a sig-
nificantly greater impact on production. The conclusions are basically un-
changed even after considering the extraordinary periods during Volker’s
Chairmanship.
Another concern is that large shocks might be affected by a few outliers.10
In Figure 3.3, the model is re-estimated after excluding observations greater
than 3 standard deviations. Figure 3.3 suggests that the monetary policy ef-
fect on production is weaker for large shocks even after excluding inordi-
nately large shocks.
FIGURE 3.3: Exclusion of early periods of Volker’s chairman-
ship and extraordinary shocks
Note: Thick lines and shaded areas show impulse responses and 90 percent confidence inter-
vals estimated after excluding Chairman Volcker’s earlier monetary targeting periods from
October 1979 to May 1981. Broken lines with dotted lines are impulse responses and 90 per-
cent confidence intervals after excluding shocks greater than 3 standard deviations. Circles
represent impulse responses of the main results, for reference.
Table 3.3 summarizes other robustness checks. The upper and lower
panel of Table 3.3 are impulse responses to linear Romer shocks and RS
Romer shocks under alternative specifications, respectively.
10Another potential concern might be that large shocks are measurement errors. However,
significant impulse responses of economic fundamentals suggest that the measurement error
hypothesis is less likely.
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Linear Romer shocks used in the main results are stratified into large and
small shocks at a certain threshold value: 1.5 standard deviations. Column
(1-b) presents the results under alternative stratifications. The alternative
threshold value between large and small shocks is 2 standard deviations in-
stead of 1.5 standard deviations. The peak response of production to small
shocks is still significantly greater than that under large shocks although the
quantitative impact weakens from -8.4% to -5.3%. Column (1-c) estimates
impulse responses with regard to shocks greater than 2 standard deviations
as outliers. This exercise is more conservative than the robustness check in
Figure 3.3. The quantitative impacts from a one-unit shock are almost iden-
tical to the main results, and the differences between large and small shocks
are still significant.
Next, the RS Romer shocks used in the main results are identified as resid-
uals of the reaction function, in which both parameters and standard devi-
ation of the shocks are regime-switching. Column (2-b) shows the impulse
response to an alternative RS Romer shock that is identified with a model in
which only the standard deviation of shocks is regime-switching. The peak
responses of -8.4 and -2.5 percent at h = 30 for small and large shocks are
quite similar to -9.5 and -2.6 percent of the main results. The difference be-
tween large and small shocks remains significant.
Column (2-c) reports the estimated impulse responses under alternative
regime transition process. Following Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and Ten-
reyro and Thwaites (2016), this study employs the logistic function to de-
scribe a smooth transition process between the states instead of a Markov
switching process.
qˆ (st) = 1  e
q
jet j c
se
1+ eq
jet j c
se
,
where q denotes a parameter to control transition smoothness and is set to
3 to give an intermediate degree of intensity to the regime-switching, as in
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the study by Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016); c is an arbitrary constant used
to determine what proportion of observations the economy spends in a large
shock state.11 Column (2-c) clearly shows that the results are almost identical
to the main results.
Finally, the “Calender dates” columns of (1-d) and (2-d) suggest that the
main results are robust even if the monetary policy shocks of non FOMC
months are imputed with zero values. In summary, our main results are
robust to other shock size classifications, specifications, and treatments of
missing observations.
11In this exercise, we set c so that the top 20 percent of shocks are classified as large shocks.
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3.4 Why does the shock size matter?
This section examines several hypotheses pertaining to why shock size mat-
ters for monetary policy effects.
3.4.1 Menu cost pricing
The first hypothesis is that the lumpy price adjustments implied by mod-
els with menu costs of price adjustments12 cause asymmetric responses to
large and small shocks. In the presence of menu costs, (small) monetary
policy shocks are non-neutral to economic fundamentals because a consid-
erable fraction of prices remain unchanged. However, large shocks slightly
influence economic activities because the majority of firms find it optimal to
adjust prices. Consequently, standard menu cost models suggest smaller out-
put responses and larger price responses to large monetary policy shocks.13
The impulse responses presented in Figure 3.2 contradict the theoretical
prediction of standard menu cost models. Specifically, output and price re-
sponses are weaker for large monetary policy shocks. We can conclude that
menu cost pricing is not the relevant hypothesis for the shock size depen-
dency of monetary policy effects.14
3.4.2 Information effect
The second hypothesis concerns the information effect. Romer and Romer
(2000) mentioned that a monetary policy surprise conveys information about
12Among others, see Ball and Mankiw (1994), Golosov and Lucas (2007), and Midrigan
(2011).
13Using a menu cost model, Karadi and Reiff (2014) analyzed the impact of large tax
shocks.
14To be clear, this study did not test menu cost pricing. It just argues that menu cost pricing
cannot provide quantitative explanation for the impulse responses in Figure 3.2. In the later
section, we discuss other hypotheses consistent with menu cost pricing.
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Federal Reserve’s assessment of the economic outlook.15 For ease of expla-
nation about conventional interest rate channels and information effects, this
study considers an intertemporal Euler equation and solves it in forward,
yt = Etyt+1   (it   Etpt+1   rt ) ,
=  Et
¥
å
i=0
(it+i   pt+1+i   rt+i),
where yt, it, pt, and rt are output, nominal interest rates, inflation, and nat-
ural rates of interest, respectively. In standard models, a positive monetary
policy shock increases the real interest rate it   Etpt+1 and creates contrac-
tionary impacts on the economy.
When we consider the information revealed through the monetary pol-
icy action, the effect of a policy surprise is not limited to a depressing effect
through the real interest rate. As suggested by Romer and Romer (2000) and
Nakamura and Steinsson (2013), the policy surprise may also increase the
prospects of future natural rates rt+i because economic agents regard that
the Fed is more optimistic about the path for potential output.16 Specifically,
agents infer that the Fed has private information that supports the increased
natural rate of interest in the future. The information effects mitigate the
depressive effects impelled by increases in real interest rates.
If large shocks have stronger effects on agents’ beliefs about future natural
rates, monetary policy effects become asymmetric to large and small shocks.
15Recently, Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) and Jarocinski and Karadi (2018) identify the
information effects of monetary policy in high-frequency domains.
16Fujiwara et al. (2005) examine the monetary policy in a liquidity trap when the percep-
tion of natural rate could be updated.
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To check the shock size dependency of the information effect, this study esti-
mates the following state transition model using survey expectations:
Dybct,t+1 =
8><>: I (st)
 
m0 + l0et

+ [1  I (st)]
 
m1 + l1et

(linear Romer shock),
q (st)
 
m0 + l0e˜t

+ [1  q (st)]
 
m1 + l1e˜t

(RS Romer shock),
(3.4)
where Dybct+i is the consensus forecasts of economic growth rate to the next
year compiled by Blue chip economic indicators.17
TABLE 3.4: Response of survey expectations to a monetary pol-
icy shock
Linear Romer shocks RS Romer shocks Linear model
Small Large Small Large (for reference)
shock shock shock shock
l0 l1 l0 l1 l0 = l1
Coefficient 0.2634 0.0477 0.0668 0.0705 0.0819
S.E. 0.1122 0.0214 0.0159 0.0263 0.0297
t-value 2.3476 2.2234 4.1979 2.6797 2.9617
Wald test: H0 :l0 = l1 2.6827 0.0194 -
p-value 0.1029 0.8893 -
Note: S.E. is the HAC standard error.
The positive coefficient of monetary policy shocks supports the informa-
tion effect. The results in Table 3.4 show that the estimated parameters for
small and large shocks are both positive, suggesting that a contractionary
monetary policy shock increases expectations about output growth. How-
ever, the coefficients of small and large monetary policy shocks are statisti-
cally indifferent in cases of either linear and RS Romer shocks. An interpreta-
tion of this evidence is that private agents update their beliefs proportionally
to the shock size when they face large or small monetary policy surprises. In
conclusion, the information effect is unlikely to be a relevant hypothesis that
can explain our main results.
17For each year, the economic forecast is the GDP growth rate of the year until the May
survey and those of the next year after the June survey. We switch the forecast horizon
at June survey mainly due to data limitations of early surveys. This treatment is reasonable
because the survey is conducted during the first week of each month and the quick estimates
of first quarter’s GDP is released in mid-May.
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3.4.3 Selective gradualism of monetary policy
A clue that might explain the shock-size dependent effects of monetary pol-
icy is the distinct responses of term spreads. In the main results, responses
of term spreads to small shocks are significantly positive and exceed 2 per-
cent for linear Romer shocks and 5 percent for RS Romer shocks at the peak,
but its response to large shocks is weak and remains less than 0.5 percent for
two years after the shock. Term spreads reflect views on future monetary
policy. The increase in term spreads suggests that economic agents expect
the continuation of monetary tightening, whereas stable term spreads sug-
gest that economic agents regard a monetary policy surprise as being merely
temporary. Such expectations are relevant for the spending and investment
decisions made by households and firms.
Term spreads increase after monetary tightening due to the Federal Re-
serve’s gradualism. As described in the address of Chairman Bernanke18, a
central bank that takes a gradualist approach “tends to adjust interest rates
incrementally, in a series of small or moderate steps in the same direction.”
From a theoretical perspective, Woodford (2003) argues that a commitment
to gradual interest rate adjustment is optimal and gives central banks more
control over term spreads through the expectations channel. Our empirical
results are consistent with the view that the Federal Reserve follows a grad-
ualist approach after small shocks.
At the same time, the Federal Reserve does not always take a gradualist
approach. It prefers to rapidly respond to certain episodes for some time. In
the same address mentioned above, Chairman Bernanke argued that the Fed-
eral Reserve has undertaken aggressive strategies when “the risk of doing too
little appeared to exceed the risk of too much”. Some theoretical studies (c.f.
18“Gradualism,” speech delivered at an economics luncheon co-
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (Seattle
Branch) and the University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, May 20,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200405202/default.htm.
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Soderstrom (2002)) have clarified that the optimality of a gradualist approach
depends on the model specification and sources of uncertainty. During large
shocks, the Federal Reserve may deviate from its gradualist approach and
take a short-lived aggressive approach.
Gradualism with some exceptions, which we call “selective” gradualism,
can be specified by the following monetary policy rule:
it = ig,t + ia,t, (3.5)
ig,t = rgig,t 1 +
 
1  rg
 
tppt + tyyt

+ eg,t,
ia,t = raia,t 1 + ea,t, (3.6)
where ig,t and ia,t are gradual and aggressive components of the policy rate
it; eg,t and ea,t are respective monetary policy shocks that follow i.i.d normal
processes of N(0, sx2fg,ag); and pt and yt are inflation and logarithmic devi-
ations of output from its steady state.
The gradual component, ig,t, captures that the central bank eventually re-
flects the changes in inflation, output, and monetary policy shock eg,t to the
policy rate. rg represents the degree of gradualism. However, the aggressive
component, ia,t captures that the central bank can respond to some unob-
served events with different lengths of persistence.
If the selective gradualism is the source of differences between large and
small shocks, the persistence of aggressive shocks will be lower than that of
a gradualist monetary policy shock: rg > ra. To estimate these persistence
parameters, this study employs impulse response matching as in the study
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Specifically, it searches rg and ra that min-
imize the distance between impulse responses of our main results and those
generated by a medium-scale DSGE model of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005), in which the monetary policy rule is replaced by (3.5). Other
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parameters are calibrated as standard values in the literature.19
TABLE 3.5: Estimated parameters: interest rate smoothing ver-
sus shock inertia
Persistence Standard deviations
rg: gradualism ra: aggressive sg sa
Linear Romer shock 0.7002 0.4087 0.0159 0.0101
RS Romer shock 0.8460 0.5910 0.0235 0.0096
The results of impulse response matching also support the selective grad-
ualism hypothesis. Table 3.5 reports that the parameters of interest rate smooth-
ing, rg = 0.70 for linear Romer shocks and rg = 0.85 for RS Romer shocks,
are greater than those of the aggressive shock persistence, ra = 0.41 and
ra = 0.59, for respective cases.20 The analyses so far suggest that selective
gradualism is the source of size-dependent effects of the monetary policy.
3.5 Revisiting state-dependent effects of monetary
policy through the lens of shock size
This section revisits some other state-dependent effects of monetary policy
reported in previous studies. Specifically, it examines the following hypoth-
esis before and after controlling the shock size: (1) high uncertainty reduces
the monetary policy effects, and (2) monetary policy effects are less powerful
during low growth periods.
In the analyses below, this study first replicates each hypothesis using a
standard state-transition local projection model. Then, it re-estimates the im-
pulse responses after stratifying shocks according to the shock size. To avoid
the potential overlap between shock size distribution and other economic
19Appendix explains about impulse response matching in details.
20The estimated parameters of interest rate smoothing are similar to or slightly lower than
values in other previous estimates (c.f Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) 0.82; Smets and
Wouters (2007) 0.81).
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states, the study classifies monetary policy shocks into the small number of
large shocks greater than 2 standard deviations and other shocks.
3.5.1 Dependency on economic uncertainty
Aastveit, Natvik, and Sola (2017) and Castelnuovo and Pellegrino (2018) em-
ploy nonlinear vector autoregression models and report that the US mone-
tary policy is less powerful under higher uncertainty.21 To re-examine these
results in previous studies, this study estimates a state-dependent local pro-
jection model, which is the same model as in the previous section except for
two points. First, this study modifies the identification of monetary policy
shocks. Instead of a policy reaction function used in the analysis so far, this
study estimates the state-dependent policy reaction function, which allows
for coefficients to be different for high and low uncertainty states.
DFFt = F (vt) khigh
0
Xt + [1  F (vt)] klow0Xt + eˆt, (3.7)
where vt represents the state of the economy in general and is a measure of
uncertainty in this case, and F() represents the probability of high uncer-
tainty. Considering the smooth transition from one state to the other, this
study employs the logistic function as in the previous section. The proxy of
macroeconomic uncertainty is a six-month moving average of an indicator
developed by Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015), which is adopted in the
aforementioned studies.
Estimated monetary policy shocks in Figure 3.4 are quite similar to those
of linear Romer shocks: the correlation between linear and uncertainty-dependent
Romer shocks is 0.941. Although the transition probability F(vt) switches
21Real option effects on business investments (Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Bloom (2009)),
households’ precautionary savings (Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1992)), and financial institu-
tions’ behavior (Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014)) are potential sources of this phe-
nomenon.
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several times during the sample period, it is maintained low during the “great
moderation” periods.
FIGURE 3.4: Uncertainty and monetary policy shocks
Descriptive statistics in Table 3.6 suggest that large shocks are more fre-
quent under high-uncertainty regimes. Fourteen shocks greater than 2 stan-
dard deviations occurred under a high-uncertainty regime but just once un-
der a low-uncertainty regime.
TABLE 3.6: Monetary policy shocks under high and low uncer-
tainty
N N2sejej N3sejej Positive shocks Mean S.D. Max Min
(% of total)
Overall 314 15 5 51.3 -0.005 0.346 1.737 -3.114
High uncertainty 113 14 5 55.8 0.004 0.529 1.737 -3.114
Low uncertainty 201 1 0 48.8 -0.011 0.177 0.564 -0.706
Note: High (low) uncertainty periods in this table are defined as the periods of F(vt) > (
)0.5
Next, we specify the impulse response function that allows for parame-
ters to be different depending on the state of uncertainty as follows:
zt,h = dt + F (vt)
n
a
high
h + b
0,high
h I (st) eˆt + b
1,high
h [1  I (st)] eˆt + ghigh
0
xt
o
+ [1  F (vt)]
n
alowh + b
0,low
h I (st) eˆt + b
1,low
h [1  I (st)] eˆt + glow
0
xt
o
+ zt,
(3.8)
where impulse responses at horizon h comprise the combination of two eco-
nomic states and two shock sizes: b0,highh (small shocks, high uncertainty),
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b
1,high
h (large shocks, high uncertainty), b
0,low
h (small shocks, low uncertainty),
and b1,lowh (large shocks, low uncertainty).
The first row of Figure 3.5 presents the responses of the economy un-
der high and low uncertainty regimes estimated without controlling for the
shock size. The monetary policy effects on production are less effective un-
der higher uncertainty, as reported in previous studies. The difference of the
effects under high uncertainty and low uncertainty is significantly positive
at the bottom around 24 months after a shock.
However, these asymmetric responses disappear once the shock size is
controlled. The second row of Figure 3.5 shows impulse responses to all
monetary policy shocks except for a small number of huge shocks. A mone-
tary policy shock under high uncertainty is just as effective as the one under
low uncertainty. The difference between these two presented in the third col-
umn stays around zero and is insignificant. The responses to large shocks in
the third row suggest that large shocks significantly impact production un-
der high uncertainty regime though the quantitative impact is nearly zero.
In summary, except for a small number of huge shocks, a monetary policy
shock has a similar effect under either high or low uncertainty regime. This
finding stresses the importance of controlling for the shock size distribution
in the empirical analysis of any monetary policy effect.
3.5.2 Dependency on economic growth rates
Thoma (1994) and Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) argue that the monetary
policy is more effective under high growth rates. Now, this study exam-
ines the dependency on economic growth rates by estimating those similar
to (3.8) but different in the state variable. At this time, the state variable vt
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FIGURE 3.5: Impulse responses of production: high uncertainty
versus low uncertainty
Note: Shaded area denotes the 90 percent confidence interval.
is the two-year moving average of economic growth rates rather than a mea-
sure of uncertainty.22 To obviate the state dependency of the policy reaction
function, Romer shocks are estimated using a nonlinear function of economic
growth rates as (3.7).
Figure 3.6 reports that the estimated monetary policy shocks are similar
to the linear Romer shocks.23 Descriptive statistics in Table 3.7 report that
large shocks occurred more frequently during the high-growth state.
Figure 3.7 suggests that empirical results on growth rate dependency are
robust even if a small number of huge shocks are excluded. First, impulse
responses in the first row show that a positive shock to the policy rate sig-
nificantly negatively impacts production when the economy is expanding.
22Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) calculate the smooth transition function in the same man-
ner.
23The correlation between these two shocks is 0.939. The transition probability of the
high-growth and low-growth states is also similar to the ones in the study by Tenreyro and
Thwaites (2016).
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FIGURE 3.6: Economic growth and monetary policy shocks
TABLE 3.7: Monetary policy shocks in high and low-growth
states
N N2sejej N3sejej Positive shocks Mean S.D. Max Min
(% of total)
Overall 314 12 5 47.1 -0.007 0.357 1.829 -3.291
High growth 248 10 4 45.6 -0.014 0.365 1.829 -3.291
Low growth 66 2 1 53.0 0.019 0.330 1.158 -0.653
Note: High (low) growth periods are the periods of F(vt) > ()0.5.
On the contrary, the same shock has only insignificant effects on production
when the economy is contracting. The responses in the second row present
that this pattern holds true after excluding large shocks. As for a small num-
ber of large shocks in the third row, a monetary policy does not significantly
impact production in expansionary periods. It has a significant but weak ef-
fect in contractionary periods. The phrase “ cannot push on a string” is still
relevant even after controlling for the shock size.
Although our conclusions are in line with those of Tenreyro and Thwaites
(2016), the economic interpretation is different. With reference to the study by
Vavra (2014), Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) conjecture that recessions are of-
ten characterized by high uncertainty and thus frequent price changes, which
leads to a steep Phillips curve and ineffective monetary policy. However, as
in the previous subsection, high uncertainty is not the source of asymmetric
monetary policy effects except for periods of large shocks. Theoretical explo-
ration of this issue is an interesting topic for future studies.
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FIGURE 3.7: Impulse responses of production: high growth
versus low growth
Note: Shaded area is the 90 percent confidence interval.
3.6 In Closing
This study empirically examines whether shock size matters for US monetary
policy effects. Using the nonlinear local projection method, this study finds
that large shocks are less powerful than small shocks. This study suggests
that the monetary policy design, rather than menu cost pricing and informa-
tion effects, is the relevant cause of the differences in policy effects between
large and small shocks. Finally, it clarifies that large monetary policy shocks
are crucial for identifying uncertainty dependency of monetary policy effects,
which is indicated in recent studies.
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Appendix A
Sensitivity Checks on the Major
Determinant of Business Cycles
A.1 The alternative end of sample
In our estimation, the end of the sample periods is 2009/1Q that is consistent
with Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011) and suitable to avoid the
distorting effects caused by a zero boundary on nominal interest rates. Here,
we show that the variance decompositions are almost unchanged even when
the end of sample is 2008/4Q.
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A.2 Subsample estimations
To check the robustness of the results in the main text, we run subsample
estimations by splitting the full sample periods into the first and second half.
Table A.2 shows that our main conclusion is unchanged although the effects
of housing demand shocks and monetary policy shocks, which are catego-
rized in “Other demand”, increase in the latter half of the sample periods
(subsample II).
TABLE A.2: Variance decomposition at business cycle frequen-
cies: Subsample estimations
Housing LTV MEI Tech- Markups Other
demand nologies demands
Yobs: baseline case 14.8 13.9 2.6 44.8 4.1 18.2
subsample I 13.7 12.9 2.6 48.2 4.1 16.7
subsample II 16.4 9.0 1.6 46.6 5.0 19.5
Iobs: baseline case 23.0 18.8 6.7 18.1 4.7 27.2
subsample I 23.4 18.1 8.2 17.6 4.7 25.6
subsample II 28.0 13.0 4.7 19.6 5.4 27.1
Cobs: baseline case 5.9 9.4 4.7 44.3 3.7 29.8
subsample I 5.2 8.1 3.3 49.1 3.1 28.5
subsample II 4.7 5.5 3.0 44.7 2.9 36.2
Ql,obs: baseline case 74.9 3.2 2.9 10.5 1.0 6.7
subsample I 75.4 2.6 3.0 11.1 0.8 6.1
subsample II 74.8 1.9 1.5 10.6 0.8 9.3
Bobs: baseline case 25.5 47.0 10.7 6.5 1.5 7.9
subsample I 23.3 46.6 14.3 5.7 1.8 6.9
subsample II 32.9 42.0 5.4 6.9 1.5 9.7
Note: Subsample I and II correspond 1975/1Q-1991/4Q and 1992/1Q-2009/1Q, respectively.
Variance decomposition to periodic components with business cycles between 6 and 32 quar-
ters is presented using the spectrum of the linearized model. The drop credit and land price data
rows correspond to variance decomposition in the case that the baseline model is evaluated
at the posterior mean of parameters alternatively estimated without using credits and land
prices data. For computational details, see also the Note for Table A.1. "Other demands",
"Technologies", and "Markups" correspond to the contributions of "patience", "monetary
policy", and "government expenditure" shocks, those of "neutral" and "investment-specific"
technology shocks, and those of "price" and "wage" markup shocks, respectively.
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A.3 Estimation with hypothetical data
In Table 6 of the main text, we re-estimate the model without using Bobs and
Ql,obs. To check its robustness, we estimate the model with hypothetical data
that are generated by the baseline model evaluated at the posterior means
of parameters. The hypothetical data is a length of 100 periods. Table A.3
shows that the main conclusion are unchanged even if hypothetical data is
used for estimation.
TABLE A.3: Variance decomposition at business cycle frequen-
cies: actual data versus hypothetical data
Housing LTV MEI Tech- Mark- Other
demand nologies ups demands
Yobs actual data 0.0 0.0 44.7 37.4 9.7 6.4
hypothetical data 0.0 0.0 46.9 45.2 4.1 2.6
Iobs actual data 0.0 0.0 73.6 11.8 7.1 6.2
hypothetical data 0.0 0.0 83.3 12.0 2.5 1.4
Cobs actual data 0.0 0.0 32.8 30.9 9.5 24.0
hypothetical data 0.0 0.0 39.9 38.5 4.7 14.9
Ql,obs actual data 0.0 0.0 36.1 29.4 9.8 21.1
hypothetical data 0.0 0.0 43.1 36.2 7.4 10.7
Bobs actual data 0.0 1.2 46.5 22.7 7.2 16.8
hypothetical data 0.0 1.2 52.9 26.9 6.5 7.9
Note: “Other demands”, “Technologies”, and “Markups” correspond to the contributions
of “patience”, “monetary policy”, and “government expenditure” shocks, those of “neu-
tral” and “investment-specific” technology shocks, and those of “price” and “wage” markup
shocks, respectively. In this exercise, the baseline model is evaluated at the posterior mean
of parameters re-estimated with calibrated at q¯ = 0.001 and without using credits and land
prices data. For computational details, see also the main text. The actual data case corre-
sponds to the without collateral const. and Bobs & Qi,obs case in Table 6 of the main text. In the
hypothetical data case, the data for estimation is generated by the model evaluated at the
posterior mean of parameters of the baseline case.
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A.4 Estimation diagnostics: baseline case
Figure A.1 suggests that the parameters are clearly identified by showing the
prior and posterior distributions are different for most of parameters.
FIGURE A.1: Prior versus posterior distributions
Note:Black and gray lines are posterior and prior distributions of parameters.
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Figure A.2 and A.3 suggest the estimation converges by showing that
Brooks and Gelman’s convergence statistics.
FIGURE A.2: Convergence diagnostics (1)
Note:Gray and black lines are posterior draws of respective chains.
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FIGURE A.3: Convergence diagnostics (2)
Note:Gray and black lines are posterior draws of respective chains.
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Appendix B
Impulse response matching
In the impulse response matching exercise, this study uses the empirical im-
pulse responses of production and policy rates to normalize large and small
monetary policy shocks. The DSGE model is identical to that in the study
by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) except for the monetary pol-
icy rule. Since the frequency of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) is
quarterly, this study uses the monthly responses of production and Federal
Funds rates every 3 months. To minimize the distance between the empirical
and model’s impulse responses, it employs the csminwel procedure devel-
oped by Chris Sims. Calibrated parameters are summarized as follows.
TABLE B.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameters Calibrated values
Habit persistence of consumption 0.73
Subjective discount factor 1.03 1/4
Marginal disutility of hours 1.00
Capital share 0.36
Capital depreciation rate 0.025
Calvo (wage) 0.64
Calvo (price) 0.60
Price elasticity of demand 6.00
Taylor rule (inflation) 1.50
Taylor rule (production) 0.50
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